Abstract
It is argued that, without a controversial and arguably mistaken assumption, Becker and Cudd's (1990) objections do not undermine the challenge raised by my (1987) model of iterated prisoner's dilemmas for the arguments of Taylor (1976, 1987) and others. Furthermore, it is argued that, even granting this assumption, there is an alternative model that avoids their objections.
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Thanks to Jonathan Adler and especially Roy Sorensen for their comments on an earlier version of this rejoinder.
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Carroll, J.W. The indefinitely iterated prisoner's dilemma: Reply to Becker and Cudd. Theor Decis 34, 63–72 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01076105
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01076105