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Semantic emphasis in causal sentences

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Abstract

A shift in emphasis can change the truth-value of a singular causal sentence. This poses a challenge to the view that singular sentences predicate a relation. I argue that emphasized causal sentences conjoin predication of a causal relation between events with predication of a relation of causal relevance between states of affairs (or perhaps facts). This is superior to the treatments of such sentences offered by Achinstein, Dretske, Kim, Sanford, Bennett, and Levin. My proposal affords clarity regarding logical structure, at least at a certain level of detail. It makes the relation between the content of an emphasized causal sentence and the unemphasized version clear. It answers some questions about the ontological requirements of the truth of emphasized causal sentences, without introducing new entities (as do some other accounts) or unacceptable consequences for identity and individuation of events.

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Stern, C.D. Semantic emphasis in causal sentences. Synthese 95, 379–418 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063879

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