Skip to main content
Log in

The electoral budget cycle

  • Published:
Public Choice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This article begins with a review of the now substantial literature on the thesis that polticians manipulate governmental outputs so as to favor their chances of reelection. It concludes that while this “electoral cycle” thesis was initially overstated by its proponents, it retains more plausibility than recent critics have allowed. This conclusion is then demonstrated through an analysis of expenditures by the ten provincial governments in Canada between 1951 and 1984.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Alt, J.E. and Chrystal, K.A. (1983). Political economics. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alesina, A. (1987). Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game. Journal of Economics 102: 651–678.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alesina, A. (1988). Macroeconomics and politics. In S. Fischer (Ed.), NBER macroeconomics annual. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alesina, A. (1989). Politics and business cycles in industrial democracies. Economic Policy 8: 54–87.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alesina, A. and Sachs, J. (1988). Political parties and the business cycle in the United States, 1948–1984. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 20: 62–82.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alesina, A. and Roubini, N. (1990). Political cycles in OECD economies. Stockholm: Conference on Economic Policy in Political Equilibrium.

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, T.W. and Hsiao, C. (1982). Formulation and estimation of dynamic models using panel data. Journal of Econometrics 18: 47–82.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beck, N. (1987). Elections and the Fed: Is there a political monetary cycle? American Journal of Political Science 31: 194–216.

    Google Scholar 

  • Betancourt, R. and Kelejan, H. (1981). Lagged endogenous variables and the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. Econometrica 49: 1073–1078.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bizer, D.S. and Durlouf, S.N. (1989). The behavior of U.S. tax rates: 1879–1986. Unpublished Manuscript, Stanford University.

  • Blais, A. (1982). Politique agricole et résultats électoraux en milieu agricole au Québec. Canadian Journal of Political Science 11: 333–383.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blais, A., McRoberts, K. and Nadeau, R. (1983). Les cycles électoraux et les dépenses des gouvernements du Québec et de l'Ontario. Vancouver, Congrès annuel de l'Association Canadienne de Science Politique.

  • Borjas, G.J. (1984). Electoral cycles and the earnings of federal bureaucrats. Economic Inquiry 22: 447–460.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown, T.A. and Stein, A.A. (1982). The political economy of national elections. Comparative politics 14: 479–499.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cain, B., Ferejohn, J. and Fiorina, M. (1987). The personal vote: constituency service and electoral independence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cameron, D.R. (1978). The expansion of the public economy: A comparative analysis. American Political Science Review 72: 1234–1261.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cameron, D.R. (1986). The growth of government spending: The Canadian experience in comparative perspective. In K. Banting (Ed.), State and society: Canada in comparative perspective. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cusak, T.R., Notermans, T. and Rein, M. (1989). Politico-economic aspects of public employment. European Journal of Political Research 17: 471–500.

    Google Scholar 

  • Doron, G. and Tamir, B. (1983). The electoral cycle: A political economic perspective. Crossroads, pp. 141–164.

  • Dupré, R. (1987). The evolution of Quebec government expenditures, 1867–1969. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Toronto.

  • Durbin, J. (1970). Testing for serial correlation in least-squares regression when some of the regressors are lagged dependent variables. Econometrica 38: 410–421.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foot, D.K. (1977). Provincial public finance in Ontario: An empirical analysis of the last twenty-five years. Toronto: Ontario Economic Council.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foot, D.K. (1979). Political cycles, economic cycles and the trend of public employment in Canada. In M.W. Bucovetsky (Ed.), Studies in public employment and compensation in Canada. Montreal: Institute for Policy Research.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frey, B.S. (1978). Politico-economic models and cycles. Journal of Public Economics 9: 203–220.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frey, B.S. and Schneider, F. (1978a). An empirical study of politico-economic interaction in the United States. Review of Economics and Statistics 60: 174–184.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frey, B.S. and Schneider, F. (1978). A politico-economic model of the United Kingdom. Economic Journal 88: 243–254.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frey, B.S. and Schneider, F. (1979). An econometric model with an endogenous government sector. Public choice 34: 25–45.

    Google Scholar 

  • Golden, D.G. and Poterba, J.M. (1980). The price of popularity: The political business cycle reexamined. American Journal of Political Science 24: 696–714.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gow, J.I. (1985). Histoire de l'administration québécoise, 1867–1970. Montreal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grier, K.B. (1989). On the existence of a political monetary cycle. American Journal of Political Science 33: 376–390.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hamelin, J. and Caron, A. (1969). La vie politique au Québec. In V. Lemieux (Ed.), Quatre elections provinciales au Québec. Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haynes, S.E. and Stone, J.A. (1990). Political models of the business cycle should be revised. Economic Inquiry 28: 442–465.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hibbs, D.A. (1977). Political parties and macroeconomic outcomes. American Political Science Review 71: 1467–1487.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hibbs, D.A. (1987). The American political economy: Macroeconomics and electoral politics in the United States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hsiao, C. (1986). Analysis of panel data. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kavanagh, D. (1989). The timing of elections: The British case. In I. Crewe and M. Harrop (Eds.), Political communications: The general election campaign of 1987. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kiewiet, D.R. and McCublins, M.D. (1985). Congressional appropriations and the electoral connection. Journal of politics 47: 59–83.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kmenta, J. (1971). Elements of econometrics. New York: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lowery, D. (1985). The Keynesian and political determinants of unbalanced budgets: U.S. fiscal policy from Eisenhower to Reagan. American Journal of Political Science 29: 429–460.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maddala, G.S. (1977). Econometrics. New York: McGraw-Hill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maslove, A.M., Prince, M.J. and Doern, G.B. (1985). Federal and provincial budgeting. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mintz, A. (1988). Electoral cycles and defense spending: A comparison of Israel and the United States. Comparative Political Studies 21: 368–381.

    Google Scholar 

  • Monière, D. (1988). Le discours électoral: Les politiciens sont-ils fiables? Montréal: Québec Amérique.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nickell, S. (1981). Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrica 49: 1399–1416.

    Google Scholar 

  • Paldam, M. (1979). Is there an electoral cycle? A comparative study of national accounts. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 81: 323–342.

    Google Scholar 

  • Paldam, M. (1981). An essay on the rationality of economic policy: The test case of an electoral cycle. Public Choice 37: 287–307.

    Google Scholar 

  • Paldam, M. (1989). Does politic matter at all?: A comparative test of partisan cycles for 17 countries. Unpublished Manuscript, Aarhus University.

  • Rogoff, K. (1987). Equilibrium political budget cycles. NBER Working Paper No. 2428.

  • Rogoff, K. (1990). Equilibrium political budget cycles. American Economic Review 80: 21–36.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rogoff, K. and Siebert, A. (1988). Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles. Review of Economic Studies 55: 1–16.

    Google Scholar 

  • Saywell, J. (1962). Parliament and politics. In J. Saywell (Ed.), Canadian Annual Review for 1962. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simeon, R. and Miller, R.E. (1980). Regional variations in public policy. In D. Elkins and R. Simeon (Eds.), Small worlds: Provinces and parties in Canadian political life, 242–284. Toronto: Methuen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sorensen, R.J. (1987). Macroeconomic policy and government popularity in Norway, 1963–1986. Scandinavian Political Studies 10: 301–322.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spafford, D. (1981). Highway employment and provincial elections. Canadian Journal of Political Science 14: 135–143.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stimson, J.A. (1985). Regression in space and time: A statistical essay. American Journal of Political Science 29: 914–947.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thomas, M. (1985). Election proximity and senatorial roll call voting. American Journal of Political Science 29: 96–112.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tufte, E.R. (1978). Political control of the economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Blais, A., Nadeau, R. The electoral budget cycle. Public Choice 74, 389–403 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00137686

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00137686

Keywords

Navigation