Conclusion
In conclusion, I shall indicate one consequence of (3.4). The major resultof work on infinitely iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games is that there existcooperative equilibria in such games. I have suggested above that myaccount of finitely, but indefinitely, iterated Prisoner's Dilemma gamesreflects the nature of genuine iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas more accu-rately than accounts involving infinite iterations. If my suggestion iscorrect, then one consequence of (3.4) - of there being only uncooperativeequilibria in finitely, but indefinitely, iterated games - is to call intoquestion the significance of the existence of cooperative equilibria ininfinitely iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games.
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Thanks to Jules Coleman, Mark Isaac, John Pollock, and Gregory Karva for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Some of these results were presented as part of similar papers given at the 1986 meeting of the society for Exact Philosophy and at Bowling Green University.
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Carroll, J.W. Indefinite terminating points and the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Theor Decis 22, 247–256 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134087
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134087