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Devastation and Forced Evacuation: The Actors and Their Motives

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Honest Errors? Combat Decision-Making 75 Years After the Hostage Case

Abstract

On 28 October 1944, Adolf Hitler ordered Lothar Rendulic, Commander-in-Chief of the 20th Mountain Army, to evacuate civilians to the east of Lyngen in Norway and destroy their homes. This event was later adjudicated before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in the case against Generaloberst Alfred Jodl. Although Jodl claimed that it was Josef Terboven who gave the order, Jodl was found guilty and executed in 1946. The following year, Rendulic was indicted before a US military tribunal for the same facts. He claimed that the scorched earth tactics were necessary for withdrawal of his troops. The judges believed Rendulic and acquitted him. Historical research for this chapter shows that there were strong political motives behind the measures taken and that Terboven played a crucial part. Evacuees in Northern Norway were reluctant to follow instructions from the occupation regime. In Eastern Finnmark, people were threatened into evacuating: they were told what would happen if the “Bolsheviks” arrived. However, most were not intimidated or persuaded. Their resistance imperiled the entire Norwegian occupation regime, and Terboven responded with even tougher measures. Contemporaneous material reveals that Rendulic and his subordinate commanders considered Northern Norway’s total devastation and forced evacuation needless distractions. Terboven’s actions were likely linked to a power play as the occupation regime in Norway headed for its downfall. Terboven attempted unsuccessfully to strengthen his grip on the German army in Norway.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Fernschreiben, 29.10.44 from OKW/WFSt, signed Jodl, attached to KTB, 20. (Geb.) AOK, Anlageband 16.10.–31.10.44. NARA, T312/1068, PG65641/4.

  2. 2.

    Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal Nuremberg, 14 November–1 October 1946, vol. 15 (Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1947), p 555.

  3. 3.

    Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, vol. 11, pp 1134–1136.

  4. 4.

    Ibid., pp 1295–1297.

  5. 5.

    Eriksen and Halvorsen 1987 argued this view, which is also evident from Per Kristian Olsen (see Olsen 2019) and Ingunn Elstad (see Elstad 2020).

  6. 6.

    Eriksen and Halvorsen 1987, pp 39–40; NHM FO II, Div, L0031, 1c No. 1114/44 Secret (inquiry into the evacuation), 29 October 1944, signed by Ebeling.

  7. 7.

    Copies of Holtskog’s report can be found in several archives, here based on SATØ, South Varanger Police Department (Appendix), Eba 1. See also Fosnes 1974; Augestad 2016.

  8. 8.

    This is according to the statement given by Hagelin during questioning on 7 December 1945. RA, L case, Oslo D 3802 Johan Andreas Lippestad, available from https://media.digitalarkivet.no/view/69762 [accessed 1 April 2023], pp 1484–1486.

  9. 9.

    The active role of the NA was first identified by Knut Einar Eriksen and Terje Halvorsen (see Eriksen and Halvorsen 1987, pp 40ff). For Prytz’s speech, see minutes recorded from the ministerial meeting on 26 September 1944, secret state matter, RA/S-4279/Db/L0111, available from https://media.digitalarkivet.no/view/39772/168 [accessed 1 April 2023] (emphasis in the original).

  10. 10.

    Minutes recorded from the ministerial meeting on 26 September 1944, secret state matter, RA/S-4279/Db/L0111, available from https://media.digitalarkivet.no/view/39772/168 [accessed 1 April 2023].

  11. 11.

    Minutes recorded from the ministerial meeting on 26 September 1944, secret state matter, RA/S-4279/Db/L0111, available from https://media.digitalarkivet.no/view/39772/168 [accessed 1 April 2023].

  12. 12.

    Neumann arrived in Norway from his role as adjutant to Reinhard Heydrich, cf. Bohn 2000, p 118. Heydrich was the Commander of the Reichssicherheitshauptsamt, one of the main SS departments and was therefore directly subordinate to the powerful SS Commander Heinrich Himmler.

  13. 13.

    Stated by Heinrich Schnurbusch during questioning on 7 October, von Stackelberg 9 October. But Neumann was with Rendulic on 8 October, so the former is likely to be correct.

  14. 14.

    Statement from von Stackelberg, given during questioning on 25 November 1945. RA, L case, Oslo D 3802 Johan Andreas Lippestad, available from https://media.digitalarkivet.no/view/69762 (pp 1524–1534) [accessed 1 April 2023].

  15. 15.

    Statement from Heinrich Schnurbusch, November 1945, RA, L case, Oslo D 3802 Johan Andreas Lippestad, available from https://media.digitalarkivet.no/view/69762 (pp 1535–1539) [accessed 1 April 2023].

  16. 16.

    Von Stackelberg’s statement dated 1 February 1946. RA/S-3138/0001/D/Dg/L0409, folder “G. W. Müller. Forklaringer etc.”.

  17. 17.

    RA/S-3138/0048/D/Db/L0034, L case Peder J. Berg. Questioning of Ferdinand Jodl, 13 December 1945. Fosnes (see Fosnes 1974, pp 11 and 16) interprets it as though Terboven gradually gained influence over something that was originally a military matter (cf. also Jacobsen 2017, p 323). This description is therefore not comprehensive.

  18. 18.

    NHM, FO II, Div, L0031, 1c No. 1114/44 Secret (inquiry into the evacuation), 29 October 1944, signed by Ebeling.

  19. 19.

    OKW, WFSt, KTB II, entries from 28 September 1943, 19 November 1943, with reference to “Führerweisung No. 50”; Ziemke 1959, pp 249–250 and 276ff.

  20. 20.

    The fear was pervasive, cf. OKW, WFSt, KTB II, entries dated 4 July 1943, 8 September 1943. See Chap. 3.

  21. 21.

    Cf. OKW, WFSt, KTB III A, entry dated 5 January 1943.

  22. 22.

    Ziemke 1959, pp 252, 276.

  23. 23.

    See especially Zetterberg 2002.

  24. 24.

    Ziemke 1959, p 293.

  25. 25.

    Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol XI, p 1114; NOKW-1776. See also Fosnes 1974, pp 7–9; Jaklin 2016, p 60; Jacobsen 2017, pp 212–213. See also more detailed documented dated 6 October from Korsnes 2021, with reference to NARA, PG32162, T1022/1719 and available from: https://actanorvegica.no/2021/02/28/brenning-og-tvangsevakuering-i-finnmark-1944 [accessed 1 April 2023].

  26. 26.

    Korsnes 2021, with reference to NARA, OKW 138/2, microfilm T77/1419. See also Fosnes 1974, p 8. Regarding “Raum Kirkenes”, see KTB (Geb.) AOK 20/la, entries dated 14 and 15 October. At the same time, further clarifications were also issued from OKW/WFSt and (Geb.) AOK 20 concerning physical destruction, which largely followed up on the order from 4 October, cf. also Fosnes 1974, pp 14–15.

  27. 27.

    Fosnes 1974, p 11.

  28. 28.

    Fosnes 1974, pp 10–11.

  29. 29.

    RA/S-3138/0048/D/Db/L0034, L case Peder J. Berg. Minutes, meeting in Billefjord, 14 October 1944.

  30. 30.

    RA/S-3138/0048/D/Db/L0034, L case Peder J. Berg. Minutes, meeting in Tromsø, 19 October 1944.

  31. 31.

    Eriksen and Halvorsen 1987, pp 41–44; Olsen 2019, pp 44–64.

  32. 32.

    Elstad 2020, pp 193–194, 216–218.

  33. 33.

    Fosnes 1974, pp 32–33.

  34. 34.

    RA/S-3138/0048/D/Db/L0034, Letter dated 25 October 1944 from Neumann to SD Hammerfest.

  35. 35.

    Augestad 2016, p 31. See also Chap. 5.

  36. 36.

    RA/S-3138/0001/D/Dg/L0409, L case G.W. Müller. “The retreat of the XX Army through Finnmark and Troms and the evacuation of the Northern Norwegian industry”, report by Carlo Otte, November 1944.

  37. 37.

    L case G.W. Müller, Oslo pkm, Dg L0409. Questioning of Günther Marre, 26/02/1946.

  38. 38.

    Questioning of Günther Marre, 26/02/1946. L case G.W. Müller, Oslo pkm, Dg L0409.

  39. 39.

    NHM 153. PWIS no. 80 “Reichskommissariat for occupied Norwayˮ; Gschaid 1995, p 282. Diary entry 27/11/1944.

  40. 40.

    Sander 2017, p 2263. See also Jacobsen 2017, p 325.

  41. 41.

    The letter from Terboven to Bormann, which has been preserved in the OKW archive, is, however, dated 28 October, cf. Kjetil Korsnes, “Burning and forcible evacuation in Finnmark”, available from: https://actanorvegica.no/2021/02/28/brenning-og-tvangsevakuering-i-finnmark-1944/ [accessed 1 April 2023].

  42. 42.

    Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal Nuremberg, vol. 15, p 555. See also Fosnes 1974, p 44; Elstad 2020, p 246.

  43. 43.

    Schott 1980, p 67.

  44. 44.

    An extensive biographical account of Jodl’s relationship with Hitler can be found in Scheurig 1999, pp 102–324.

  45. 45.

    Megargee 2000, p 81.

  46. 46.

    The report that the subdivision, Wehrmachtführungsstab/Operationsabteilung (Heer) Nord (WFSt/Op. (H) Nord), drew up during the autumn of 1944 is preserved in BA-MA, RW 4/74.

  47. 47.

    BA-MA, RW 4/714a. Memorandum “Betr.: Räumungsmaßnahmen in Nord-Norwegen”, 28/10/1944.

  48. 48.

    BA-MA, RW 4/714a. Memorandum WFSt/Qu. 2 (Nord), 29/10/1944.

  49. 49.

    For more information on the Lyngen Line, see Chaps. 2 and 3.

  50. 50.

    BA-MA, RW 4/653. Letter from Alfred Jodl to Martin Bormann, 16/11/1944.

  51. 51.

    BA-MA, RW 4/714a. Memorandum WFSt/Op (H) Nord, 12/11/1944. These were concerns that Jodl did not share, as stated in the aforementioned letter: Residents who evaded the forced evacuation would run the risk of starvation and hypothermia at their own risk; Sweden still lacked “the military prerequisites” to go to war with Germany and the possibility of a scorched earth operation causing further resentment against the occupation regime could be countered through “timely and savvy” propaganda that communicated “the military necessity” of a forced evacuation, as well as the announcement of “support measures for the population”. These statements were made by a man who was completely out of touch with the situation in Norway and the population’s relationship with the occupier.

  52. 52.

    This is according to Oberst Bernhard von Watzdorf, Moser’s General Chief of Staff in the LXXI Corps. See Watzdorf 1965, p 347.

  53. 53.

    NHM, FO II Div, L0031, Questioning of Falkenhorst by Ivar Follestad, 1 September 1947. Per Kristian Olsen has also addressed von Falkenhorst’s assessment. See Olsen 2019, p 66.

  54. 54.

    BA-MA, RW 4/714. Letter from Alfred Jodl to AOK 20, WBN and Josef Terboven, 15/10/1945.

  55. 55.

    RA, RAFA-3915, Da, L0077. Report from questioning of Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, 19.9.1945, p 103.

  56. 56.

    BA-MA, RW 4/714a. Letter from Wilhelm Keitel to AOK 20, WBN, OKM and others, 27/10/1944.

  57. 57.

    Rendulic 1952, pp 321–324.

  58. 58.

    Neumann also added: “In der Propaganda ist allerdings nach wie vor restlose Zerstörungsabsicht zu bekunden”. RA/S-3138/0048/D/Db/L0034, Letter dated 25 October 1944 from Neumann to SD Hammerfest. See also Fosnes 1974, p 34; Elstad 2020, p 218.

  59. 59.

    However, during questioning in 1946, Willy Laqua stated that Moser eventually advocated strongly in favour of forced evacuation and total destruction, cf. Elstad 2020, p 459. However, the information from Laqua does not correspond to the information in Watzdorf 1965, p 347.

  60. 60.

    NHM FO II, Div, L0031, Vernehmungsniederschrift, 28 March 1946. See also questioning of Otto Blank, RA, L case, Oslo D 3802 Johan Andreas Lippestad, available from https://media.digitalarkivet.no/view/69762 (pp 1576–1577). Accessed 1 April 2023. Nevertheless, it can be noted that both Hölter and Rendulic published books after the war in which they defended the burning and forced evacuation. Without any regret, Hölter, in particular, portrayed the forced evacuation virtually as a humanitarian undertaking.

  61. 61.

    RA/S-3138/0048/D/Db/L0034, L case Peder J. Berg. Questioning of Ferdinand Jodl, 13 December 1945 (Norwegian minutes).

  62. 62.

    See Chap. 3.

  63. 63.

    OKW “Studie über die Verteidigungsmöglichkeiten des nordlappländischen Raumes nach Abschluss der Operation ‘Birke’ und einen anschliessenden Rückzug nach Norwegen”, 13 August 1944.

  64. 64.

    KTB (Geb.) AOK 20/Ia, entry 22 October 1944.

  65. 65.

    Rendulic to Jodl, 24 October 1944. In the war diary of (Geb.) AOK, it is clearly stated that this was Rendulic’s principled view, cf. KTB (Geb.) AOK 20/Ia, entry 24 October 1944.

  66. 66.

    Questioning of Otto Blank, RA, L case, Oslo D 3802 Johan Andreas Lippestad, available from https://media.digitalarkivet.no/view/69762 (pp 1576–1577) [accessed 1 April 2023].

  67. 67.

    Elstad 2020, p 264.

  68. 68.

    RA/S-3138/0048/D/Db/L0034, L case Peder J. Berg. Reporting by Heinrich Schnurbusch, November 1945. See also Olsen 2019, pp 76–78. Schnurbusch was the successor to Neumann as the commander of the Einsatzstab Neumann.

  69. 69.

    RA/S-3138/0048/D/Db/L0034, Letter dated 25 October 1944 from Neumann to SD Hammerfest.

  70. 70.

    RA, L case, Oslo D 3802 Johan Andreas Lippestad. von Stackelberg’s report, 25 November 1945. Available from https://media.digitalarkivet.no/view/69762 (pp 1524–1534) [accessed 1 April 2023].

  71. 71.

    1114/44 Secret (inquiry into the evacuation), 29 October 1944, signed by Ebeling.

  72. 72.

    Same location. This is consistent with what Ferdinand Jodl explained during questioning on 13 December 1945.

  73. 73.

    Questioning of Otto Blank, RA, L case, Oslo D 3802 Johan Andreas Lippestad, available from https://media.digitalarkivet.no/view/69762 (pp 1576–1577) [accessed 1 April 2023].

  74. 74.

    Nevertheless, it is difficult to obtain further knowledge of this due to the paucity of sources from lower levels.

  75. 75.

    Ragnar Hansen’s report, pp 55–56.

  76. 76.

    Pictet 1960, p 52.

  77. 77.

    BA-MA, N619/18. Letter from Bruno von Uthmann to Curt Stumpff, 28/06/1945.

  78. 78.

    BA-MA, RW 4/651. Letter W. Keitel to H. Himmler, 21/11/1944.

  79. 79.

    Report Wilhelm Esser, 15/07/1945. RA, L case Wilhelm Esser.

  80. 80.

    Nøkleby 2003, p 180.

  81. 81.

    Rediess’ close associate, Hans Latza, believed this to be the case at any rate. Himmler’s wish was Rediess’ law, according to a statement made by Latza soon after the war and the instruction was to avoid anything that could spoil the cooperation with Terboven. Report Hans Latza “Verhältnis zu den führenden Persönlichkeiten […]ˮ, 10/12/1945. RA, L case Hans Latza.

  82. 82.

    BA-MA, RW 4/639. Letter R. Bamler to W. Warlimont, 15/05/1943.

  83. 83.

    Nøkleby 2003, p 179.

  84. 84.

    Rusiecki 2010.

  85. 85.

    Brenden and Thomassen 2013, pp 251–252.

  86. 86.

    Nøkleby 1992, pp 31–35.

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Other Documents

  • Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal Nuremberg (1947–1949), 14 November–1 October 1946 (“The Blue Series”), Vols 1–42. International Military Tribunal, Washington. Available at The Library of Congress: https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Nuremberg_trials.html

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Bones, S., Hatlehol, G.D. (2024). Devastation and Forced Evacuation: The Actors and Their Motives. In: Hayashi, N., Lingaas, C. (eds) Honest Errors? Combat Decision-Making 75 Years After the Hostage Case. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-611-6_4

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