Abstract
The science of climate politics refers to the scientific basis of political strategies. This chapter argues that, in addition to the handicapped use of power by DCs, the use of accommodation policies by ICs (7.1), the structural imbalance in knowledge (8.4), the consensus in the FCCC and related non-decisions can be explained by the existence of processes of exclusion in agenda formation and decisionmaking (9.2). Section 9.3 proposes the politics of compromise as a strategy to reduce potential bottlenecks.
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DCs have different problems (Africa’s problem is food security, South America’s is debt), and they have diversity in approaches (Toye 1988). Sebenius (1993: 209) submits that one should not “shoe-horn countries with vastly different climate interests — from coal-rich developing countries such as China and India to sub-Saharan Africa to the Second World of Eastern Europe to Norway and the United States — into catchall categories such as “North” and South” (cf. Harris 1988).
“A persistent theme of the discussion so far has been the potential for North-South confrontation over international agreements to protect the global environment. The complexity of modern environmental issues argues, however, against the future effectiveness of bloc politics that has characterised many UN deliberations of the past ... Environmental negotiations are frequently characterised by shifting alliances on different sub-issues, reflecting varying priorities and domestic inferences among the parties” (Benedick 1993: 235).
The South Commission (Nyerere et al. 1990: 1–2) explains that DCs exist on the periphery of the ICs. While the majority in the North is rich, the majority in DCs is poor, while IC economies are resilient and strong, DC economies are weak and defenceless, while ICs are in control of their destinies, DCs are more vulnerable to external influences and lack ‘functional sovereignty’ or the ability to exercise sovereignty, in a political and economic sense.
Of the 23 trillion $ global GDP, DCs earn only 5 trillion despite having 80% of the world population (UNDP 1996: 2). Furthermore, the impacts of climate change are also likely to lead to divergence of per capita incomes (Tol 1997).
“... to abandon the dialogue is precisely what parts of the North would want. ... An instinct for hanging on to power tells them to resist the South” (Ramphal 1983: 19).
Some researchers ask if DCs should enter into negotiations that they are likely to lose. Mazrui (1983: 134–148) argues that complete exit from the global system is impossible because the global telecommunication revolution prevents isolation. Unconditional entry is unwise given the ‘unfair’ global system. Mazrui recommends selective participation in Conventions and that DCs should strive for greater self-reliance, domestication (make foreign things domestically relevant), diversification (see new points of entry), horizontal interpenetration (penetrate DC markets), vertical counter-penetration (enabling the poor to penetrate and influence the rich), etc.
This argument is similar to the argument that in the absence of trade unions, minimum wage laws and social security, potential employees under-cut each other’s salaries till the one who asks the least is selected. DCs recognise their weakness and feel exploited by such types of compromise.
Braybrooke/ Lindblom (1963: 104–109) warn that such policy is not necessarily conservative as it can lead to big changes. They cite Sir Henry Maine’s observation of the common law system: “The fact is that the law has been wholly changed, the fiction is that it remains what is always was” (1963: 109). The attitudes underlying incremental policy need to be empirically determined.
Benedick states: “An important lesson ... is the usefulness of separating an issue into more manageable components rather than trying to design an ideal and comprehensive treaty at one stroke. Attempting to solve all aspects of a complex problem within one framework can prove to be a formula for delay; the perfect becomes the enemy of the good” (1993: 238).
This word has been used by different authors to imply different things. This definition and in fact the text in this sub-section has been adapted from Gupta 1996a.
“And since the substance of politics is hard choices, it is precisely the hard choices that are excluded wherever possible. They are hidden, neglected, postponed and ignored. ... Means become ends. Tactics prevail over principles” (Gore 1992: 168).
For example, Lunde (1990: 6) cites KJoppenburh and Kelinman’s article to show that 80–90% of genetic resources are imported from the South; that global warming will be seriously affected in the future by the impacts of DC emissions and that the ICs will need the cooperation of DCs.
“1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. 2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace. 3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. 4. To be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of those common ends.”
Further, while DCs are trying to get ICs to be more just towards them, they are not so fair and equitable to each other or to the people within their countries.
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Gupta, J. (1997). The Science of Climate Politics. In: The Climate Change Convention and Developing Countries: From Conflict to Consensus?. Environment & Policy, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8925-3_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8925-3_9
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