Abstract
The rules governing treaty implementation in Australia derive principally from two sources: the provisions of the Australian Constitution and Australian doctrine concerning the relationship between international law and municipal law. In the body of these same rules are also found the main constitutional limitations upon Australia’s treaty-making power. With regard to constitutional limitations, this chapter will consider not only those affecting treaty implementation but also those affecting the power to conclude treaties.
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Leipzig, 1899 ). No attempt will be made to discuss extensively and thoroughly the problems relating to the doctrine of legal sources, sovereignty, and the concept of law as such, although the relationship between international law and municipal law will not be properly understood without discussing the problems and doctrines mentioned above. The literature on these subjects is too well known and the study leaves no room for an exclusive and thorough examination of the problems involved.
See Pohle, Der Einzelne im Konflikt zwischen Völkerrecht und nationalem Recht (Essen, 1952 ), PP. 14ff.
With regard to a thorough examination of the problem see Gustav Adolf Walz, Völkerrecht und staatliches Recht (Stuttgart, 1933 ); Josef L. Kunz, “Landrecht und Völkerrecht,” Strupps Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts und der Diplomatie, Vol. I (1924), P. 787ff.
See Pohle, op. cit.
Compare Alfred Verdross, Völkerrecht (Wien, 195o).
O. cit., especially on p. irr: “Völkerrecht und Landesrecht sind nicht nur verschiedene Rechtsteile, sondern auch verschiedene Rechtsordnungen. Sie sind zwei Kreise, die sich höchstens berühren, niemals schneiden.”
Dionisio Anzilotti, Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts, Vol. r, German translation by Cornelia Bruns and K. Schmid (Berlin and Leipzig, 1929), p. 37ff.
Einführung in das Völkerrecht (Tübingen, 1951), pp. 36–37.
Die Abänderung völkerrechtsgemässen Landesrechts (Berlin, 1927), p. 145ff.
With regard to this, see Hermann Maschke, Die Rangordnung der Rechtsquellen (Berlin, 5932).
See Pohle, op. cit., p. 14.
See to this Hermann Mosier, “Die Erweiterung des Kreises der Völkerrechtssubjekte,’ 22 ZaöRV I (1962), who argues that the subjects of international law have increased in the last decade or so.
See Pohle, op. cit., p. 12.
After being highly in favor of the extreme monist doctrine (compare, e.g., Das Pro. blew der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts (Tübingen, 192o), p. 12off. he became a representative of the moderate monist school; compare his Reine Rechtslehre (Leipzig, Wien, 1934 ), P. 129ff.
Völkerrecht (2nd ed., Berlin, 1950), p. 60ff; see with regard to the changes of Verdross’ doctrine: Walz, Völkerrecht und staatliches Recht (Stuttgart, 1933), p. 1o4ff; Verdross supported the monist doctrine and the doctrine of primacy of municipal law; see: “Zur Konstruktion des Völkerrechts,” 8 Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, 329 esp. at 353; he then argued a radical monism; see to this: Die Einheit des rechtlichen Weltbildes auf Grundlage der Völkerrechtsverfassung (Tübingen, 1923), Preface VI and esp. p. 134; he is now arguing a moderate monism and the doctrine of primacy of international law, and points out the congruency of his theory with the dualist doctrine on some specific points; Völkerrecht, op. cit., p. 62.
Landesrecht und Völkerrecht,“ Strupps Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts und der Diplomatie, Vol. i (1924), P. 787ff.; see also his Völkerrechtswissenschaft und Reine Rechtslehre (Leipzig und Wien, 1923).
Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts, 2 Vols. (Basel, 1948–57) Vol. 1, p. 21ff., esp, pp. 24–25. Guggenheim thought first that international law and municipal law are co-ordinated in another higher and universal legal order; see to this esp. op. cit., p. 27, note 7.
Verbindlichkeit und Konstruktion des positiven Völkerrechts (Hamburg, 1948 ). C. criticizes the dualist doctrine and develops his own monistic theory. He has many meeting points with Kelsen. His construction is based upon the assertion that any legal subject has a legal consciousness, and that there exists, in any legal order, a predominant fundamental legal norm.
Grundlehre des Völkerrechts (2nd ed., Köln, 1948 ). S. represents the catholic school of natural law, asserting a divine and superior universal legal order.
See Verdross, Völkerrecht, op. cit., p. 61.
Staatsverträge und Gesetze als Quellen des Völkerrechts (Dorpat, 1876).
Die deutschen Staatsverträge,“ 36 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 1 (188o).
a Juristische Grundprobleme, Vol. r: Der Begriff des Gesetzes (Berlin, 1920), p. 344ff.; esp. 387 and p. 406. “Das Völkerrecht ist dem Gesetze, in dem es seinen Geltungsgrund findet, untergeordnet… Das Gesetz ist ihm gegenüber höheres Recht, der Gesetzgeber steht über der völkerrechtlichen Instanz.”
Grundzüge des Völkerrechts (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1903).
See Grundlinien der Philosophie und des Rechts, oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse (3rd ed., 1854 ), P. 416ff.
Maschke, op. cit., p. 98.
See Walz, op. cit., p. 89, n. 74.
Ibid., op. cit., p. 266.
See to this Pohle, op. cit., with special references.
Alf Ross, Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts (Stuttgart und Köln, igsr), p. 62.
Reference is made here to Ross, op. cit., p. 6off. and Rousseau, Principes Généraux du Droit International Public (Paris, 1944), p. 55ff., who illustrates the theoretical conflict between dualistic and monistic constructions systematically and clearly.
Günther Doeker, “The Fifth French Republic,” 3 I.A.L.R. 146 (1961).
Gerhard Leibholz, 16 Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, 353 and Article 8o of the Italian Constitution of 1947.
See Phillip C. Jessup, “Has the Supreme Court Abdicated one of its Functions,” 40 A.J.I.L. 168 (1946) at 170.
For a recent analysis, see Felice Morgenstern, “Judicial Practice and the supremacy of international law,” 27 B.Y.I.L. 42 (1950); see also H. Lauterpacht, “Is International Law Part of the Law of England,” 25 Transactions of Grotius Society, 52 (1939): McNair, “When do British treaties involve legislation,” 9 B.Y.I.L. 59 (1928).
Cas. temp. 281; II Digest (RepL.) 634. Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 6o, see also Lord Finlay’s emphatic affirmation of that view in the Lotus Case, (1927) P.C.I. J. Series A, on. Jo, p. 54, and Judge Moore’s reference, ibid., p. 75, to “the majestic stream of the common law united with international law”; see, however Mortensen v. Peters (1906) 14 S.L.R. 227, 43 S.L.R. 872; per L. J. Atkin in Commercial and Estates Co. of Egypt v. Board of Trade, x K.B. (1925) 271 at p. 295; per Lord Atkin in Chung Chi Cheung v. The King (1939) A.C.,6o; per Lord Macmillan in The Christina (1939) A.C. 485, 497.
) 12 Ex. D. 63.
Règles Générales du Droit de la Paix,“ 62 Recueil des Cours 99 (1937) IV at 132.
) 2 K.B. 391.
) 2 A.C. 77.
See Mortensen v. Peters (1906) decision of the High Court of Justiciary of Scotland, 8 F. (Ct. of Sess.) 93 and Polites v. The Commonwealth (1945) decision of the High Court of Australia, 70 C.L.R. 6o.
See Chung Chi Cheung v. R. (1939) A.C.,6o at p. 168, citing, however, The Berlin (1914), p. 265 at p. 272.
See Morgenstern, op. cit., pp. 73 et. seq. Cook v. Sprigg (1899) A.C. 572, and W.H. Moore, Act of State in English Law (London, 1906), pp. 78, 82, and pp. 132ff.
The Le Louis (1817) 2 Dods. 21o, at pp. 251 and 254.
See generally McNair, “L’Application et l’Interprétation des Traités D’Après la Jurisprudence Britannique,” 43 Recueil des Cours 251 (1933), at 245–62; Walker v. Baird (1892) A.C. 491 at p. 497. The Parlement Belge (1879) 4 P.D. 129 and A.G. for Canada v. A.G. for Ontario (1937) A•C. 326 at p. 347. Cf. Francis v. R. (1956), 3 D.L.R. (2d) 641.
See The Zamora (1916) 2 A.C. 77.
a See also J. G. Starke, An Introduction to International Law, 5ed, London 1963, p. 79 f.
See Polites v. Commonwealth (1945) 70 C.L.R. and cf. Mohammad Mohy-ud-Din v. King Emperor (India) (1946) 8 F.C.R. 9, and Theophile y. Solicitor-General (195o), A.C. 586.;8 Re Piracy Jure Gentium (1834) A.C. 586.
a See, however, Alexandrowicz, Charles Henry, “International Law in the Municipal Sphere According to Australian Decisions” 13 I.C.L.Q. 78 (1964) at 92, who comes to a different conclusion, by using a method of interpretation, which does not take into account the problem of distribution of legislative powers under the Australian Constitution.
) 24 C.L.R. 166.
C.L.R. 182, see also Wynes, W. Anstey, Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia, 2nd ed. 1956, p. 111
C.L.R. 557.
a Wynes, ibid., op. cit.
C.L.R. 344.
a See Wynes, op. cit., p. II2.
) 7o C.L.R. 6o.
a Compare Wynes, op. cit., p. 112.
) 77 C.L.R. 449.
Per Latham C.J. at 462, per Starke J. as to ships of war and public vessels, 471.
) II U.S. 16.
a see also Wynes, op. cit., p. 113.
Citing Chung Chi Cheung v. The King (1939) A.C. 16o at 169.
) 77 C.L.R. 461.
Ibid., 465, 466.
Ibid., 484.
a See also Wynes, op. cit., p. 113.
) A.C. 167, 168.
a see also Wynes, op. cil., p. 114.
) 77 C.L.R. 481.
Wynes, op. cut., p. 114
) A.C. 167, 168
see Wynes, op. cit., p. 114. 63b Ibid., p. 115.
) A.C. 497, 498.
A.C. 1939, pp. 16o-168.
o C.L.R., pp. 68ff.
Per Latham CJ, at p. 69.
This principle seems also to be applicable as to non-treaty rules, as Polites v. The Commonwealth shows.
72 C.L.R. 449.
McNair, op. cit., 1936, pp. 7ff.; see also Dominges Caitano v. Ministère Public, Annual Digest, 1938–40, case No. 186, where the Egyptian Mixed Court of Appeal states that in Egypt, Italy and Belgium (since 1937) the British conception prevails.
Applied by the Nigh Court in Polites v. Commonwealth (1945) 70 C.L.R. 6o.
Ser. B, No. r5, at pp. z6, 27.
Ser. B, No. 17, at p. 32.
In its Advisory Opinion on the Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig the same Court said “a state cannot adduce as against another state its own constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under international law or treaties in force.” Ser. A/B, No. 44 at 24.
R. v. Burgess (x936) 55 C.L.R. 668.
) 55 C.L.R. 6o8.
a Wynes, op.cit., p. 398.
b Wynes, ibid.
C 55 C.L.R• 643.
d Ibid., 644.
The Constitutional Law of the United States (2nd ed. 1929) p. 519.
C.L.R. 658–659.
o Ibid. at 669.
Ibid.
Ibid. at 681.
Ibid. at 684.
a See also Wynes, op. cit., p. 401.
b Ibid.
C.L.R. at 684.
R. v. Poole; ex parte Henry (No. 2) (1939) 6i C.L.R. at 648.
C.L.R. 659, 66o.
) 61 C.L.R. 634.
a Wynes, op. cit., p. 403.
b Ibid., p. 405.
A.G. for Canada v. A.G. for Ontario (1937) A.C. 326. 88a See also Wynes, op. cit., p. 405.
-51) 83 C.L.R. 152.
) 65 C.L.R. 413.
a Wynes, op. cit., p. 405.
FJrost V. Stevenson (1937) 58 C.L.R. 599•
Op. cit., p. 407.
Wynes, op. cit., p. 405; this seems also to be the view of Sir Robert Garran, “The Aviation Case,” 10 A.L.J. 297 (1936), where the author refers to Spencer’s attempts to define the proper limits of governmental interference with individual liberty, now “quite obliterated,,, and expresses the view that ”attempts to define the proper limits of international agreements are not likely to have much greater success,“ at p. 299; see also Wynes, op. cit., p. 405, note 2.
) 55 C.L.R. 64o.
In Victorian and Stevedoring, etc. Co. Pty. Ltd. and Meakes v. Dignan (1931) 46 C.L.R. 122, Evatt J.; see also the judgement of Dixon J. in Chow Hung Ching v. The King (1948) 77 C.L.R. 449; see also Dixon’s remarks in Sloan v. Pollard (1947) 75 C.L.R. 468, 469, where reference is made to the possible effects of evidence to show connection with the power; compare also Wynes, op. cit., p. 406 note 4.
) 58 C.L.R. 6or.
Australian Communist Party v. The Commonwealth (1950–51) 83 C.L.R. 6o1.
Marcus Clark Ltd. v. The Commonwealth (1952) 87 C.L.R. 177.
a See also Wynes, op. cit., p. 406.
Frequently, the practice has grown up of including in bi-and multilateral conventions so-called “federal clauses”, designed to obviate the difficulties of Federal States in legislating to give effect to provisions concerning subjects within the legislative power of the constituent states or provinces. Wynes, op. cit., p. 407, note 9, points out that “in relation to Australia, it is questionable how far such clauses do not operate as a limitation upon the Federal power with respect to ‘external affairs’. Insofar as a subject otherwise within state legislative competence becomes a subject of federal power by reason of this power alone, it seems that if the Commonwealth has not assumed a positive obligation it cannot legislate upon a subject not otherwise within the ordinary enumerated powers by calling in aid the power with respect to ‘external affairs’.”
C.L.R. 66g.
See Starke, op. cit., Chapter II, n. 75 supra; J. D. Holmes, “A note on the Implementation of Treaties in Australia,” ro A.L.J. 482 (1936); Starke, “The Privy Council and Competence of Federal Legislatures to Legislate Pursuant to International Obligations.” II A.L.J. 45 (1937–38) at 87, in which the author contrasts “dynamic” and “static” interpretations of a treaty power; R.J. Matas, “Treaty Making in Canada,” 25 Can. B. Rev. 458 (1947); J. P. Nettl, “The Treaty Enforcement Power in Federal Constitutions,” 28 Can. B. Rev. 1051 (195o).
a Compare Wynes, op. cit., p. 396.
) 4 C.L.R. 265.
) 4 C.L.R• 395.
) 29 C.L.R. 329.
) 49 C.L.R. 242
) 58 C.L.R. 528.
a See also Wynes, op. cit., p. 396–397•
) 79 C.L.R. 121.
Per Latham ibid. 136, 137.
See Debates (Melbourne, 1898), op. cit., Chapter II, n. 55, supra, pp. 30–31.
) 4 C.L.K. 395.
) A.C. 542.
In re Adam (1837) 2 Moo. P.C.C. 460.
C.L.R. at 425.
per Griffith G.J., 4 C.L.R. 405. See the Irish Envoys’ Case 32 C.L.R. (2923) 577 per Starke J.
See Ferrando v. Pearce (1928) 25 C.L.R. 241; Jerger v. Pearce (1920) 28 C.L.R. 588. 165 See also Wynes, op. cit., p. 409.
b Ibid.
) 55 C.L.R. 608, 643–4•
Federal Jurisdiction in Australia, (Oxford 1959,) at p. 27.
Debs. Melb. (1898) Vol. r, p. 30.
) S.R. (N.S.W.) 254. See also Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959, Section 19.
Ibid. at 261.
op. cit. at p. 30.
Pollux, “The Interpretation of the Charter,” 23 B.Y.I.L. 54 (1946) at 69.
See wynes, op. cit., p. 591. 23b Ibid., p. II, I2.
o8) 5 C.L.R. 818.
Some instances of Full Powers not considered adequate are given by Crandall, op. cit., p. 279.
See to this Blix, op. cit., pp. 3–42.
See to this Chandler P. Anderson, “The Extent and Limitations of the Treaty-Making Power under the Constitution,” s A.J.I.L. 636 (1907), and “The Extension of Congressional Jurisdiction by the Treaty-Making Power,” 16 A.J.I.L. 400 (1920).
Compare Lord Atkin’s statement for the Privy Council in Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario and others, (1937), A.C. 326, at 347; see also McNair, op. cit., p. 8r.
For an early report on the need for Parliamentary sanction, see that by Sir Philip Yorke and Sir Charles Talbot (1728) in Chalmers, Opinions of Eminent Lawyers, Vol. II p. 339; W. S. Holdsworth, History of English Law, Vol. IX, p. 76, n. 4, refers to Molyns v. Fiennes (1365) in Select Cases before the King’s Council (1243–1482), Selden Society’s Publications, Vol. XXXV, pp. 48–53, as “an early authority for the modern rule of constitutional law that a treaty which changes or modifies the law needs the sanction of Parliament,” cited in McNair, op. cit., p. 83, n. I.
L.R. 4, P.D. 129.
L.R. 5, P.D. 197.
L.R. (1892) A.C. 491. 22 82 B.F.S.P. 994.
) A.D. 492, 497.
as See for this and for a historical survey of the development of the rule Holdsworth, “The Treaty-Making Power of the Crown,” 58 L. Q. Rev. 175 (1942).
Amongst numerous illustrations see Reg. v. Wilson (1877) L.R. 3 Q.B.D. 42; In re Castioni, L.R. (1891) 1 Q.B. 149•
See with respect to British practice McNair, op. cit., pp. 94, 106–7, and treaties cited therein.
See Hobbs v. Henning (1865), 34 L.J.C.P. 117 and Seymour v. London & Provincial Insurance Co. (1872) 41 L.J.C.P. 193, both cases on policies of insurance, and Fenton Textile Association V. Krassin and others (1922) 38 T.L.R. 259.
The question is discussed in Danaodhar Gordham v. Deorarn Kanji (1876) T.A.C. 332 (an Indian appeal).
See to this McNair, op. cit., pp. 94ff.
See the Acts and Statutes passed to approve certain treaties which were concluded by Australia, Appendix No. 1.
See Hall, A Treatise on International Law (8th ed., 1924), PP. 351, 380; Oppenheim, International Law (5th ed., 1937 ) I, p. 700. But the opposite view has been strongly argued by Fitzmaurice, “Do Treaties Need Ratification,” 15 B.Y.I.L. 113 (1934) at 129; Q. Wright, Control of _American Foreign Relations (1916), pp. 38, 53; Strupp, Elements du droit international public (1927), p. 192; Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law (Vol. II, 1922), p. 9; Chailley, La nature juridique des traités internationaux (1932), pp. 167–236; Dehousse, La ratification des traités (Paris, 1935), Pp. 124–150; Article 21 of Harvard Draft on Treaties (1935); the latter lays down a rule establishing a claim in damages by a State which “justifiably” relies upon the representations made by another State as to its internal law, see to this also Fitzmaurice, op. cit., at 59ff., and 78ff., and for the British doctrine, McNair, op. cit., p. 83.
See Scelle, Précis de droit des gens (1934), Vol. II, p. 44o; Dehousse, La ratification des traités (1935), PP. 149,15o; Pitman B. Potter, “Inhibitions upon the Treaty-Making Power of the United States,” 28 A.J.I.L. 456 (1936). Chailley distinguishes between “constitutionalité extrinsèque” and “constitutionalité intrinsèque,” but argues that both are internationally the basis of the validity of treaties (La nature juridique des traités internationaux (1934), p. 240); Chailley argues on the basis of historical evidence that, even before the constitutional era, there existed certain limitations on the treaty-making power, ibid., op. cit., pp. 180–185.
This question of course raises a difficult problem as to whether certain treaties are perhaps forbidden althogether on the ground that they conflict with fundamental principles of law and morality. See Oppenheim, International Law (5th ed.) Vol. I, p. 706; A. Verdross, “Forbidden Treaties in International Law,” 31 A.J.I.L. 574 (1937); Vitta, La validité des traités internationaux, (Leyden, 194o) XIV, Chapter III.
Dehousse, op. cit., p. 58.
Oppenheim, op. cit., Vol. i, p. 725.
Wilcox, op. ctit., pp. 45ff.
To this see also the literature cited in Lauterpacht’s Oppenheim (7th ed.) Vol. r, pp. 34–44.
Article 12, Section 1 and 3(a)(b)(c) of the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties incorporates most of the theoretical and practical difficulties which surrounded the subject of ratification. The article states that treaties in principle require ratification subject, however, to exceptions outlined in Article 12, Section z(a)(b)(c) and (d). See reports of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1953 (U.N. pub., Sales No.: 59. V. 4), Vol. II, p. 112; and ibid., 1954 (Sales No.: 59. V. 7), Vol. II, p. 127 and first report of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, ibid., 1956 (U.N. pub., Sales No.: 56. V. 3), Vol. II, p. 123.
See Chapter VIII
C.L.R. 608.
See also Latham’s view, who suggested at 629 “it is very difficult to say that any matter is incapable of affecting international relations so as properly to become the subject matter of an international agreement”; according to this view, legislation can be passed on any subject in implementation of an international agreement to which Australia is a party.
C.L.R. 634.
C.L.R. 41.
C.L.R. at 179.
C.L.R. at 445.
See also for further discussion, Chapter vIII. 58 Wheare, op. cit., p. 784.
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Doeker, G. (1966). Treaty Implementation and Constitutional Limitations. In: The Treaty-Making Power in the Commonwealth of Australia. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9560-7_7
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