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Abstract

The rules governing treaty implementation in Australia derive principally from two sources: the provisions of the Australian Constitution and Australian doctrine concerning the relationship between international law and municipal law. In the body of these same rules are also found the main constitutional limitations upon Australia’s treaty-making power. With regard to constitutional limitations, this chapter will consider not only those affecting treaty implementation but also those affecting the power to conclude treaties.

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Reference

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  149. Compare Lord Atkin’s statement for the Privy Council in Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario and others, (1937), A.C. 326, at 347; see also McNair, op. cit., p. 8r.

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  150. For an early report on the need for Parliamentary sanction, see that by Sir Philip Yorke and Sir Charles Talbot (1728) in Chalmers, Opinions of Eminent Lawyers, Vol. II p. 339; W. S. Holdsworth, History of English Law, Vol. IX, p. 76, n. 4, refers to Molyns v. Fiennes (1365) in Select Cases before the King’s Council (1243–1482), Selden Society’s Publications, Vol. XXXV, pp. 48–53, as “an early authority for the modern rule of constitutional law that a treaty which changes or modifies the law needs the sanction of Parliament,” cited in McNair, op. cit., p. 83, n. I.

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  151. L.R. 4, P.D. 129.

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  152. L.R. 5, P.D. 197.

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  153. L.R. (1892) A.C. 491. 22 82 B.F.S.P. 994.

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  154. ) A.D. 492, 497.

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  155. as See for this and for a historical survey of the development of the rule Holdsworth, “The Treaty-Making Power of the Crown,” 58 L. Q. Rev. 175 (1942).

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  156. Amongst numerous illustrations see Reg. v. Wilson (1877) L.R. 3 Q.B.D. 42; In re Castioni, L.R. (1891) 1 Q.B. 149•

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  157. See with respect to British practice McNair, op. cit., pp. 94, 106–7, and treaties cited therein.

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  158. See Hobbs v. Henning (1865), 34 L.J.C.P. 117 and Seymour v. London & Provincial Insurance Co. (1872) 41 L.J.C.P. 193, both cases on policies of insurance, and Fenton Textile Association V. Krassin and others (1922) 38 T.L.R. 259.

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  159. The question is discussed in Danaodhar Gordham v. Deorarn Kanji (1876) T.A.C. 332 (an Indian appeal).

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  160. See to this McNair, op. cit., pp. 94ff.

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  161. See the Acts and Statutes passed to approve certain treaties which were concluded by Australia, Appendix No. 1.

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  162. See Hall, A Treatise on International Law (8th ed., 1924), PP. 351, 380; Oppenheim, International Law (5th ed., 1937 ) I, p. 700. But the opposite view has been strongly argued by Fitzmaurice, “Do Treaties Need Ratification,” 15 B.Y.I.L. 113 (1934) at 129; Q. Wright, Control of _American Foreign Relations (1916), pp. 38, 53; Strupp, Elements du droit international public (1927), p. 192; Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law (Vol. II, 1922), p. 9; Chailley, La nature juridique des traités internationaux (1932), pp. 167–236; Dehousse, La ratification des traités (Paris, 1935), Pp. 124–150; Article 21 of Harvard Draft on Treaties (1935); the latter lays down a rule establishing a claim in damages by a State which “justifiably” relies upon the representations made by another State as to its internal law, see to this also Fitzmaurice, op. cit., at 59ff., and 78ff., and for the British doctrine, McNair, op. cit., p. 83.

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  164. This question of course raises a difficult problem as to whether certain treaties are perhaps forbidden althogether on the ground that they conflict with fundamental principles of law and morality. See Oppenheim, International Law (5th ed.) Vol. I, p. 706; A. Verdross, “Forbidden Treaties in International Law,” 31 A.J.I.L. 574 (1937); Vitta, La validité des traités internationaux, (Leyden, 194o) XIV, Chapter III.

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  168. To this see also the literature cited in Lauterpacht’s Oppenheim (7th ed.) Vol. r, pp. 34–44.

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  169. Article 12, Section 1 and 3(a)(b)(c) of the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties incorporates most of the theoretical and practical difficulties which surrounded the subject of ratification. The article states that treaties in principle require ratification subject, however, to exceptions outlined in Article 12, Section z(a)(b)(c) and (d). See reports of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1953 (U.N. pub., Sales No.: 59. V. 4), Vol. II, p. 112; and ibid., 1954 (Sales No.: 59. V. 7), Vol. II, p. 127 and first report of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, ibid., 1956 (U.N. pub., Sales No.: 56. V. 3), Vol. II, p. 123.

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  170. See Chapter VIII

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  171. C.L.R. 608.

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  172. See also Latham’s view, who suggested at 629 “it is very difficult to say that any matter is incapable of affecting international relations so as properly to become the subject matter of an international agreement”; according to this view, legislation can be passed on any subject in implementation of an international agreement to which Australia is a party.

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  173. C.L.R. 634.

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  174. C.L.R. 41.

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  175. C.L.R. at 179.

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  177. See also for further discussion, Chapter vIII. 58 Wheare, op. cit., p. 784.

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© 1966 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

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Doeker, G. (1966). Treaty Implementation and Constitutional Limitations. In: The Treaty-Making Power in the Commonwealth of Australia. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9560-7_7

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