Abstract
The EU regime for supporting third countries in need is three-pronged: separate rules have been put in place for development cooperation sensu stricto, for economic, financial and technical cooperation, and for the provision of humanitarian aid. The second of these, the batch of provisions on economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries, is somewhat uncomfortably sandwiched between the other two. Moreover, at first glance, the distinction between the three branches may not be readily apparent. All this warrants a more extensive elaboration in this chapter. For a good understanding, we will first look into some general aspects, investigating the origin and evolution, the legal foundations and the institutional framework of the policies. In that same paragraph, we also take stock of some of their most tangible products. Hereafter, we discuss the questions and challenges currently facing the EU’s development cooperation and humanitarian aid policy, especially with regard to a perceived lack of efficacy. Thereby, we shall incorporate perspectives from the EU institutions, the Member States and third countries in equal measure.
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Notes
- 1.
Together, the EU and its Member States account for roughly 60% of the world’s official development assistance. The EU’s budget amounted to € 8.4 billion in 2010, which pales in comparison with the $ 18.8 billion handed out by the United States that same year. However, cumulatively, the EU and the Member States allocated funds to the worth of € 53.8 billion. Furthermore, as a percentage of the gross national income, the EU Member States (both individually and on a combined average) exceed the 0.17 figure of the United States by significant margins (see the data and statistics provided by the Development Cooperation Directorate of the OECD, available on http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats).
- 2.
- 3.
The Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions, which were adapted in, respectively, 1963, 1975, 1979 and 1989. Their successor is the Cotonou Agreement, signed on 23 June 2000 in Cotonou, Benin. It contains a revision clause that enables the agreement to be adapted every 5 years until 2020. It has been modified accordingly in 2005 and 2010.
- 4.
Opinion 1/78, International agreement on natural rubber.
- 5.
The pungency of this shared competence, at least vis-à-vis the CFSP, was underlined in Case C-91/05, Commission v Council (ECOWAS).
- 6.
Case C-316/91, Parliament v Council (Lomé IV).
- 7.
Joined Cases C-181/91 & C-248/91, Parliament v Commission and Council (Bangladesh).
- 8.
As the second sentence of Art. 208 TFEU informs, in all the EU policies likely to affect developing countries, the Union has to take account of the objectives of development cooperation. This closely resembles a ‘policy linking clause’ (cf. Arts. 7–14 TFEU). Article 212 TFEU extends this requirement expressis verbis to all forms of economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries. On balance then, Chapter 1, Title III, Part V TFEU seems the more important, outweighing its sibling Chapters 2 and 3.
- 9.
Cf. Art. 212 (8) TFEU. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with former USSR states have, however, also been concluded on this legal basis, as well as the UN Convention against Corruption.
- 10.
Regulation 1257/96/EC concerning humanitarian aid, OJ [1996] L 163/1.
- 11.
Regulation 1292/96 on food-aid policy and food-aid management and special operations in support of food security, OJ [1996] L 166/1.
- 12.
Regulation 2130/2001/EC on operations to aid uprooted people in Asian and Latin American countries, OJ [2001] L 248/1.
- 13.
Regulation 2258/96/EC on rehabilitation and reconstruction operations in developing countries, OJ [1996] L 306/1.
- 14.
For insight into the linkages set up by local and regional authorities, and the effective channelling of means via decentralised offices, see Bidugaren (2010).
- 15.
But unanimity is the rule for concluding agreements on economic, financial and technical cooperation with states that are candidates for accession: see Art. 218 (8) TFEU.
- 16.
To the extent that the Member States have not consented to ensure part of the funding directly: compare Art. 210 TFEU in fine.
- 17.
Cf. Art. 209 (3) TFEU.
- 18.
Regulation 1905/2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation, OJ [2006] L 378/41.
- 19.
Tagged simply as ‘Development’ in the Barosso-II Commission. The Directorate-General also holds the ACP dossier, which makes sense, since the majority of developing countries are located in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific.
- 20.
For example, the African Union and Mercosur.
- 21.
But only in those areas that have a bearing on the DG’s tasks and objectives. For the full list of OCT, see Annex II to the TFEU.
- 22.
An acronym of its former name, the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office.
- 23.
Previously, one single Commissioner was entrusted with a portfolio that encompassed development cooperation, humanitarian aid, as well as all other forms of external financial assistance.
- 24.
Cf. Art. 9 of Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, OJ [2010] L 201/30.
- 25.
Specifically, it involves the shared responsibility of preparing decisions on the three strategic, multi-annual steps within the development programming cycle: country and regional allocations, country and regional strategy papers, and national and regional indicative programmes.
- 26.
The leading donors in the EU in terms of their GNI (Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, Finland, Luxembourg) indeed channel the majority of their aid through the UN (according to the statistics drawn up by the Development Cooperation Directorate of the OECD; see http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats).
- 27.
According to the ‘European Consensus on Development’, a policy statement issued in 2005, with the intent of catching up with the pledges made in the Millenium Development Goals.
- 28.
- 29.
In this respect, the emphasis in the ‘European Consensus on Development’ that the developing countries are mainly responsible for their own development can already be qualified a first sign of retreat.
- 30.
The top three net recipients of bilateral development aid are Turkey, Morocco and Serbia (see the official figures of the Development Cooperation Directorate of the OECD, available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats).
- 31.
In the sense that its visible strengths – being the largest donor and having its own institutional machinery for development – are the priority, and that questions of aid effectiveness are only secondary.
- 32.
From an institutional perspective, an associated problem could be the overly powerful position of DG Trade, which regularly outflanks the other Commission Directorates.
- 33.
Cf. Case C-91/05, Commission v Council (ECOWAS).
References
Bidugaren JA (2010) The role of local and regional authorities in European community development policy – beyond decentralised aid. In: Hoebink P (ed) European development cooperation: in between the local and the global. Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, pp 291–309
Calderisi R (2006) The trouble with Africa: why foreign aid isn’t working. Palgrave Macmillan, London
Dickson AK (2004) The unimportance of trade preferences. In: Arts K, Dickson AK (eds) EU development cooperation: from model to symbol. Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp 42–59
Easterly W (2006) The white man’s burden: why the West’s efforts to aid the rest have done so much Ill and so little good. Penguin, London
Moyo D (2008) Dead aid. Allan Lane, London
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de Waele, H. (2011). The Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid Policy. In: Layered Global Player. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20751-8_7
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