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Strategic Games on Defense Trees

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Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (FAST 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4691))

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Abstract

In this paper we use defense trees, an extension of attack trees with countermeasures, to represent attack scenarios and game theory to detect the most promising actions attacker and defender. On one side the attacker wants to break the system (with as little efforts as possible), on the opposite side the defender want to protect it (sustaining the minimum cost).

As utility function for the attacker and for the defender we consider economic indexes (like the Return on Investment (ROI) and the Return on Attack (ROA)). We show how our approach can be used to evaluate effectiveness and economic profitability of countermeasures as well as their deterrent effect on attackers, thus providing decision makers with a useful tool for performing better evaluation of IT security investments during the risk management process.

Partially supported by the MIUR PRIN 2005-015491.

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Theo Dimitrakos Fabio Martinelli Peter Y. A. Ryan Steve Schneider

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© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Bistarelli, S., Dall’Aglio, M., Peretti, P. (2007). Strategic Games on Defense Trees. In: Dimitrakos, T., Martinelli, F., Ryan, P.Y.A., Schneider, S. (eds) Formal Aspects in Security and Trust. FAST 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4691. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75227-1_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75227-1_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-75226-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-75227-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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