Abstract
In this chapter, I discuss various cases of metaphysical equivalence. I focus on the case of the Bundle theory and Substratum theory of material objects and the case of Relationism and Substantivalism about time, and in both cases I argue for a kind of equivalence between these traditional enemies. I explore several versions of the Bundle theory and the Substratum theory. First, I examine different versions of the Bundle theory with tropes and compare them to the Substratum theory with tropes by going through various standard objections and arguing for a tu quoque in all cases. Emphasizing the theoretical role of the substratum and of the relation of compresence, I defend the claim that these views are equivalent for all theoretical purposes. I then examine two different versions of the Bundle theory with universals, and show that one of them is, here again, equivalent to the Substratum theory with universals, by examining how both views face the famous objection from Identity of Indiscernibles in a completely parallel way. I then examine other versions of these views that are not equivalent to the others. I then turn my attention to Relationism and Substantivalism about time. In this chapter, I try to make some progress with respect to the debate between these two views, and I do this mainly by examining the strategies they use to face the possibilities of ‘empty time’ and ‘time without change’. As we shall see, the two allegedly very different rival views are much less different than has been thought: their structure is extremely similar, their strategies are extremely similar, and they can both face the possibilities of ‘empty time’ and ‘time without change’ in the same way. Thus, I argue in favour of a certain kind of equivalence between these two views as well.
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Notes
- 1.
One could also say ‘tying device’ or ‘object-making device’. L.A. Paul (forthcoming_b) puts forward a “mereological bundle theory” where “properties are literally objects and parts of objects, and properties are bundled using the composition relation” (§2). This version of a bundle theory thus does not use a primitive bundling relation such as “compresence” or similar, but it appeals to a primitive relation of mereological composition (i.e. a primitive notion of “is a proper part of”).
- 2.
Compare to what Peter Simons puts as an objection to BTT (my italics): “One possibility is that compresence is neither a binary (gluing two tropes) nor a ternary (gluing two tropes and a place) relation but one with many more terms, as many as there are tropes in the bundle. We may not know what arity this relation has - it might even be infinite - and there might be different arities for different types of concrete independent particular, but there will be such a relation nevertheless. A big drawback this has is that it is hard to see what explanatory force this has. All we are saying is that a bundle of tropes is held together by whatever relation holds it together. This is really giving up” (Simons 1994, p. 371).
- 3.
I’ll talk about adverbialism in §10.
- 4.
Or only contingently true.
- 5.
Of course, BTT does not suffer from this objection.
- 6.
The perhaps tempting idea to distinguish non-primitively between the compresence relations precisely by the number of properties they relate is unappealing because some distinct objects do have the same number of properties. (For instance two objects that are qualitative duplicates except for their colour.)
- 7.
Another such place, I believe (but without arguing for it here), is a bundle-theoretic-like view called the “nuclear theory”, defended by Simons (1994) and based on Husserl’s view. This view does not fit in my table from §2, indeed, it has a different structure than ‘standard’ bundle and substratum theories since, as Simons himself says, “it combines aspects of both bundle theory and substratum theory”. I believe that precisely because of its unusual structure the view is unappealing, but I do not offer any arguments to support that belief here.
- 8.
I am not saying that this solves all problems the endurantist might have with time travel.
- 9.
Indexing the relation of compresence would make it a perdurantist view.
- 10.
The word “substance” is a tricky one, and it often means very different things in the mouths of different philosophers. I shall use it as a synonym of “substratum”, and when it matters (see below) I will say precisely what it refers to.
- 11.
Not a set, since instant are not abstract entities, on this view.
- 12.
This is similar to a strategy that Paul (forthcoming_a) explores with respect to the Bundle Theory of objects, when she says: ‘[…] properties are shared, while property instances are primitively individuated. On this approach the explanation of the possibility of the qualitative indiscernibility of the spheres in W is based on an underlying identity of properties, while the numerical difference between the spheres reductively supervenes upon the numerical difference of the property instances in each bundle’.
- 13.
To illustrate this point, take the case where properties and relations are tropes—in this case, what I say parallels the claim that one trope of simultaneity is exactly similar to but primitively numerically different from another trope of simultaneity.
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Benovsky, J. (2016). Equivalent Metaphysical Theories. In: Meta-metaphysics. Synthese Library, vol 374. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25334-3_1
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