Abstract
John Searle’s famous thought experiment concerning the Chinese Room (CR) is cast rhetorically in terms that are standard for the target it seeks to defeat, the strong computational claims made about human intelligence by “strong AI” (Searle 1980). Thus, the problem is laid out in terms of physics, syntax, and semantics. The CR argument demonstrates that semantics cannot be reduced to computational syntax – or that syntax by itself can never give you semantics (intentionality, meaning).
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Notes
- 1.
Dennett notes that “the differences in a brain whose native language is Chinese rather than English would account for huge differences in the competence of that brain, instantly recognized in behavior, and significant in many experimental contexts” (1991, 209–210).
- 2.
And has replied in this way at a conference where I presented an earlier version of this paper, Backgrounding: From the Body of Knowledge to the Knowing Body. Interuniversity Centre Dubrovnik, Croatia (5–7 October 2007).
- 3.
Tim Crane (2003) argues that “…if Searle had not just memorized the rules and the data, but also started acting in the world of Chinese people, then it is plausible that he would before too long come to realize what these symbols mean.” (125). Crane appears to end with a version of the Robot Reply: “Searle’s argument itself begs the question by (in effect) just denying the central thesis of AI—that thinking is formal symbol manipulation. But Searle’s assumption, nonetheless, seems to me correct … the proper response to Searle’s argument is: sure, Searle-in-the-room, or the room alone, cannot understand Chinese. But if you let the outside world have some impact on the room, meaning or ‘semantics’ might begin to get a foothold. But of course, this concedes that thinking cannot be simply symbol manipulation.” (127).
- 4.
On this and related issues, see Marcel (1988).
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Gallagher, S. (2009). The Key to the Chinese Room. In: After Cognitivism. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9992-2_5
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