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Nominalism and Idealism

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Abstract

The article considers, in a historical setting, the links between varieties of nominalism—the extreme nominalism of the Quine-Goodman variety and the trope nominalism current today—and types of idealism. In so doing arguments of various twentieth century figures, including Husserl, Bradley, Russell, and Sartre, as well as a contemporary attack on relations by Peter Simons are critically examined. The paper seeks to link the rejection of realism about universals with the rejection of a mind-independent “world”—in short, linking nominalism with idealism.

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Notes

  1. Husserl characterized the view of Cornelius as “modern Humeanism,” (1970, pp. 419–425), and refers to Meinong’s argument—“This would seem in essentials to be Meinong’s argument….”—as being in Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, vol. 21, p. 235.

  2. Segelberg (1999, 177) cites the argument being used earlier by von Aster (1913, p. 126), and Marc-Wogau (1936, p. 139).

  3. Goodmann did not note Russell’s discussion or Russell’s generalization of the problem that led him to observe that, for the example cited above, with three properties, a triadic similarity relation would be required to specify correlate classes Goodman (1951), Russell (1940, 1948).

  4. Wetterström (1995, p. 10) (from a translation in progress by H. Malmgren).

  5. In the contemporary scenario this connects to claims about “causal chains” to establish having a linguistic and conceptual apparatus.

  6. See the reference to J. A. Wheeler below.

  7. Sartre (1956, p. xlvii).

  8. Sartre (1956, p. xlvii).

  9. Sartre (1956, p. 1).

  10. Sartre (1956, p. li).

  11. Sartre (1956, p. lii).

  12. Sartre (1956, p. lvii).

  13. Sartre (1956, p. lix).

  14. Sartre (1956, p. lx).

  15. Sartre (1956, p. lxiv).

  16. Sartre (1956, p. lxv).

  17. If I recall rightly, Wheeler once arranged for the funding of the Philosophy Department’s having Dagfin Føllesdahl come to Austin, Texas for a colloquium setting out a Quinean type perspective on experience, language and theory.

  18. Overbye (2002).

  19. For example, see Hochberg (1988, 1992).

  20. Simons (2010, p. 204). While it would be interesting to consider Sartre and Russell on negation at this point, space is fortunately “absent.”

  21. In the logical atomism lectures. It is not clear if Simons is suggesting something like Russell’s later 1925 view that suggests avoiding negative facts via universal generalizations—no atomic fact is such that …, or, alternatively, every atomic fact is either … or …. or …. On this see Hochberg (2002, pp. 283–287).

  22. Simons (2010, p. 204).

  23. Simons (2010, p. 208).

  24. Simons (2010, pp. 209–210).

  25. Whether that is illusory and they are “really one” or can be construed as a “identical” is a wild form of monism we need not pursue here.

  26. Simons (2010, p. 203).

  27. Russell (1956, p. 220).

  28. Russell (1956, p. 220).

  29. For the details of the pattern see Hochberg (1978, Chap. IV). In keeping with that pattern I have used "predicate" in the familiar ambiguous way.

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  1. University of Texas, Austin, TX, USA

    Herbert Hochberg

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  1. Herbert Hochberg
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Correspondence to Herbert Hochberg.

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Hochberg, H. Nominalism and Idealism. Axiomathes 23, 213–234 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-011-9150-3

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