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Rational Choice Theory

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Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice

Overview

Rational choice theory refers to a set of ideas about the relationship between people’s preferences and the choices they make. There are several variants of rational choice theory and this essay refers to these collectively as the rational choice approach (RCA). The conceptual foundations of the RCA originate in Cesare Beccaria’s1764 essay On Crimes and Punishments and Jeremy Bentham’s 1789 work, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. One school of thought, the deterrence approach, builds on Beccaria’s insights that effective punishments need to be swift and certain (Paternoster 2010). Alternative uses of the RCA focus on Bentham’s formalization of the idea that the motivations for actions, criminal or otherwise, are universally grounded in individual self-interest and the desire to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. As a result, punishments require a level of rationality if they are to influence people’s perceptions of the pleasures and pains...

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Sociology, University of California Davis, Davis, CA, 95616, USA

    Bill McCarthy & Ali Chaudhary

Authors
  1. Bill McCarthy
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  2. Ali Chaudhary
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Correspondence to Bill McCarthy .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement (NSCR), Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Gerben Bruinsma

  2. VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Gerben Bruinsma

  3. Department of Criminology, Law and Society, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

    David Weisburd

  4. Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem, Israel

    David Weisburd

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McCarthy, B., Chaudhary, A. (2014). Rational Choice Theory. In: Bruinsma, G., Weisburd, D. (eds) Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5690-2_396

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5690-2_396

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-5689-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-5690-2

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