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Designing Deference: Towards a Thin Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Investment Law?

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European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2021

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EUROYEAR,volume 12))

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Abstract

In light of increasing criticism against Investor-State Dispute Settlement, States have in recent years engaged in considerable reform of existing international investment agreements (IIAs). Reforms have often aimed at providing States greater discretion with respect to the measures they undertake vis-à-vis foreign investors to avoid breaching IIAs. In international dispute settlement, such discretion is most famously associated with the “margin of appreciation” (MOA) in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).

The chapter analyses such treaty reforms and examines developments of the MOA in the ECtHR. It shows that the MOA there may be evolving from a “thin” version, which mainly involves discretion, into a “thick” version, involving subsidiarity and the relationship between the ECtHR and national bodies. The chapter then analyses practice of arbitral tribunals under IIAs where the tribunals have applied, or rejected, MOA-like reasoning. It concludes that while there are many examples of awards in which tribunals have afforded discretion, resembling a “thin” version of the MOA, there are few if any examples of the “thick” version.

The “thin” version may often be compatible with the wording of specific IIAs. However, tribunals should ensure that their reasoning is based on the applicable treaty rather than borrowed concepts, which may not always be fully understood, whether by advocates, arbitrators or their audiences.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See e.g. Waibel et al. (2010); Langford et al. (2018); Schefer (2020), p. 241.

  2. 2.

    See Dimitropoulos (2020).

  3. 3.

    Caron and Shirlow (2018), p. 161.

  4. 4.

    Mclachlan (2019).

  5. 5.

    Kuluga (2020); see also Leonhardsen (forthcoming).

  6. 6.

    Caron and Shirlow (2018), p. 161 (internal references omitted).

  7. 7.

    Caron and Shirlow (2018) p. 161.

  8. 8.

    Trakman and Musayelyan (2016).

  9. 9.

    See e.g. Korzun (2017). As an example of Tribunals generally recognising this effect, the Tribunal in Plama noted that “The specific exclusion [of the Most Favoured Nation (“MFN”) clause of dispute resolution mechanisms] in the draft [Free Trade of the Americas] is the result of a reaction by States to the expansive interpretation made in the Maffezini case. That interpretation went beyond what State Parties to BITs generally intended to achieve by an MFN provision in a bilateral or multilateral investment treaty” Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005, para 203.

  10. 10.

    See e.g. Alter et al. (2016) and Zarbiyev (2012).

  11. 11.

    Dimitropoulos (2020), p. 417.

  12. 12.

    Dimitropoulos (2020), p. 418, for instance, notes that “States have been trying accordingly to transfer important decision-making powers back to the domestic level of government, and thus reconcile and sometimes undo the separation of the economic and political spheres that was brought about during the intense globalization period of the end of the twentieth century”.

  13. 13.

    See Leonhardsen (2014).

  14. 14.

    See e.g. Berge and Hveem (2018).

  15. 15.

    UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995–2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking (2007) 3–5.

  16. 16.

    Schefer (2020), p. 241.

  17. 17.

    Paras 6, 6, 6, 4 and 4 respectively. A similar result can be achieved by including a separate provision on the objective of the treaty, which may include the right to regulate, cf. e.g. Article 1 of the investment chapter of the 2013 Agreement between New Zealand and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Cooperation, according to which the objective is to encourage the mutual flow of investments “while recognising the rights of Parties to regulate and the responsibility of governments to protect public health, safety and the environment.”

  18. 18.

    Signed on 14 June 2017 between Australia, Cook Islands, Micronesia, Federated States of, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Entered into force on 13 December 2020. Italics are mine. This approach is not uniform. For example, in the 2017 BIT between Colombia and the United Arab Emirates (not entered into force), the general exceptions clause in Article 11 states: “nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Contracting Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure that is appropriate” in order to reach various listed public policy objectives. Thus, the clause is not self-judging. On the other hand, unlike many earlier IIAs, which used the term “necessary”, the current trend seems to favour the term “appropriate”. Plainly, it seems easier for a state measure to qualify as “appropriate” for reaching a public policy goal than to qualify as “necessary” for reaching a public policy goal.

  19. 19.

    See e.g. the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, Annex 9-B Expropriation, para 3. (b). The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) was signed on 8 March 2018. It has partially entered into force. The CPTPP is a separate treaty that incorporates, by reference, the provisions of the original TPP signed on 4 February 2016.

  20. 20.

    See also Article 6.8 of the Norwegian Draft Model BIT 2015. That draft also includes a separate right to regulate clause in Article 8, which somewhat confusingly emphasizes somewhat different values (e.g. the former emphasizes health and human rights, while the latter also includes labour rights).

  21. 21.

    CETA Article 8.9 subparagraphs 1–4. The CETA approach inter alia clarifies the right to regulate and labour and environmental protection standards. See the Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union and its Member States (available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:22017X0114(01). Compare e.g. the recent REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT Annex 10B (4).

  22. 22.

    See also e.g. the United States 2012 Model BIT Article 12 (2) and Article 16 of the investment chapter of the 2013 Agreement between New Zealand and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Cooperation.

  23. 23.

    See e.g. Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, Award, 28 September 2007, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, para 384. But see Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Application for Annulment of the Award, 29 January 2010, para 127 (holding that “by disregarding the self-judging nature of Article XI, the Tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers”.) On such clauses, see generally e.g. Blanco and Pehl (2020) and Sabanogullari (2018).

  24. 24.

    See e.g. Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 5 September 2008, para 182.

  25. 25.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019), WT/DS512/R, para 7.131. I am not aware of treaty tribunals finding that a clause is self-judging and then discussing the discretion granted by that clause. See, however, the Sempra Annulment Decision. However, discussions concerning discretion of clauses that the State party alleges are self-judging can be found. See e.g. Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 5 September 2008, para 181 and CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Ltd. and Telecom Devas Mauritius Ltd. v India, Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, 25 July 2016, PCA Case No. 2013-09, para 218.

  26. 26.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, para 7.132. See generally e.g. Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment of 4 June 2008, ICJ Reports 2008, 177, para 145.

  27. 27.

    However, several Tribunals have noted that security exceptions ought to be interpreted restrictively. See e.g. Enron Corp. and Ponderosa Assets L. P. v Argentina, Award (22 May 2007) ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, paras 331–332. See generally the excellent discussion in Blanco and Pehl (2020).

  28. 28.

    Ortino (2019), p. 95. While I believe States may be attempting to send such signals, and while Tribunals may sometimes act accordingly, there are however important legal limits to the impact of new treaties upon the interpretation and application of existing treaties. On “cross-treaty interpretation”, see e.g. Schill (2009), pp. 294–295.

  29. 29.

    See e.g. the broad exceptions clause in Article 10 of the 2004 Canadian Model BIT, incorporated verbatim e.g. in the 2006 Canada-Peru BIT and the comprehensive clause in Article 17 of the 2012 Japan-Kuwait BIT, which also includes a duty to notify the other party of any measures taken. For the investment chapters of FTAs it is more common to incorporate either GATT Article XX or GATS Article XIV (or both) by reference. Other IIAs use more explicit carve outs, for instance by using annexes which carve out specific sectors. See e.g. Agreement between Australia and Japan for an Economic Partnership, Annex 6, Non-Conforming Measures relating to para 1 of Articles 9.7 and 14.10.

  30. 30.

    Henckels (2012), p. 238.

  31. 31.

    See e.g. Mitchell and Henckels (2013).

  32. 32.

    E.g. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA, and InterAgua Servicios Integrales del Agua SA v Argentina, ICSID, Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010, para 217.

  33. 33.

    Schefer (2020), p. 242.

  34. 34.

    Lim et al. (2021), p. 79.

  35. 35.

    Lim et al. (2021), p. 79.

  36. 36.

    United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).

  37. 37.

    See e.g. the overview provided by the UNCITRAL Secretariat, “Possible reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) Multilateral instrument on ISDS reform”16 January 2020, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.194 (available at https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/wp194_multilateral_instrument_for_submission.pdf).

  38. 38.

    Draft report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the work of its 36th session, 6 November 2018, A/CN.9/964 (available at https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/draft_report_of_wg_iii_for_the_website.pdf).

  39. 39.

    UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of its 37th Session (New York, 1–5 April 2019), A/CN.9/970, paras 36–37.

  40. 40.

    UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of its 37th Session (New York, 1–5 April 2019), A/CN.9/970, para 30.

  41. 41.

    Article 8(2). Entry into force 7 December 2007.

  42. 42.

    Available at https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf.

  43. 43.

    Article 14.3 second subparagraph.

  44. 44.

    Available at https://globalarbitrationreview.com/digital_assets/820bcdd9-08b5-4bb5-a81e-d69e6c6735ce/Draft-Model-BIT-NL-2018.pdf.

  45. 45.

    See e.g. Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18A.K. v Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa, and CP and DO v Sąd Najwyższy, 19 November 2019. See also similarly from the ECtHR, Baka v Hungary, Application no 20261/12, 23 June 2016.

  46. 46.

    That practice has not been much discussed or referred to in investment treaty arbitration and will therefore not be explored here. See generally Zglinski (2020).

  47. 47.

    Morrisson Jr (1973).

  48. 48.

    Leonhardsen (2014), p. 139.

  49. 49.

    Fukunga (2018).

  50. 50.

    Klaus Müller v. Germany, 24173/18, judgment 19 November 2020, para 66.

  51. 51.

    Per its Article 7, it entered into force three months after the consent of all parties had been obtained.

  52. 52.

    Copenhagen Declaration on the reform of the European Convention on Human Rights system, 13 April 2018, para 10.

  53. 53.

    Explanatory report, para 9, available at https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016800d383d.

  54. 54.

    Brems (2019).

  55. 55.

    Austin and others v UK, Grand chamber application no 39692/09, para 61.

  56. 56.

    De Souza Ribeiro v France, application no 22689/07, para 84.

  57. 57.

    Ibid, para 79.

  58. 58.

    Hatton and others v UK, Application no. 36022/97, para 97.

  59. 59.

    Ibid, my emphasis.

  60. 60.

    Selami and Others against North Macedonia, Application no. 78241/13, Judgment of 3 March 2018, para 101.

  61. 61.

    Fabris v France, Application no. 16574/08, para 72.

  62. 62.

    Brems (2019), p. 11.

  63. 63.

    See Leonhardsen (2014), pp. 141–143.

  64. 64.

    The principle of proportionality often serves as an important tool for investment arbitration tribunals in similar situations, although not necessarily under the MOA label.

  65. 65.

    Marks (1995), p. 218.

  66. 66.

    Mellacher and Others v. Austria, Commission, Application No. 10522/83, 11 July 1988, para 211.

  67. 67.

    Mellacher and Others v. Austria, Judgment, 19 December 1989, para 45.

  68. 68.

    Leonhardsen (2012).

  69. 69.

    Kleinlein (2019).

  70. 70.

    Kleinlein (2019), p. 93.

  71. 71.

    Animal Defenders International v the United Kingdom, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 22 April 2013, para 108. See also Correia de Matos v Portugal, 56402/12, para 137.

  72. 72.

    Similarly, Kleinlein (2019).

  73. 73.

    See Leonhardsen (2014), pp. 142–146.

  74. 74.

    See Leonhardsen (2014), pp. 142–146 with further references.

  75. 75.

    X, Y and Z v United Kingdom, Judgment, 22 April 1997, para 13.

  76. 76.

    Zglinski (2020), p. 197.

  77. 77.

    Born et al. (2020), p. 80. See also Philip Morris, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion Co-Arbitrator Gary Born, 8 July 2016, para 183, referring to Travaux préparatoires to the ECHR, 17th Sitting, 7 September 1949, p. 1150.

  78. 78.

    See e.g. ICJ, Avena Interpretation, Provisional Measures, ICJ Reports 2008, p. 331, para 326.

  79. 79.

    Born et al. (2020), p. 79.

  80. 80.

    See e.g. Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 5 September 2008, para 164; Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italy, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, Final Award 27 December 2016, para 319.

  81. 81.

    Born et al. (2020), pp. 109, 120, 123, 124, 128, 130.

  82. 82.

    Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v. Sultanate of Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, Award, 3 November 2015, para 389 and footnote 777.

  83. 83.

    Born et al. (2020), p. 115 referring to Mercer International Inc. v. Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/3, Award, 6 March 2018, para 7.33.

  84. 84.

    Mercer International Inc. v. Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/3, Award, 6 March 2018, para 7.42.

  85. 85.

    Some cases which I analyse below might have been considered a rejection of MoA by Born et al., but are not referred to. See e.g. Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. the United States, ICSID, Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award, 25 August 2014, para 9.37.

  86. 86.

    See also Henckels (2012), p. 128.

  87. 87.

    See further Leonhardsen (2014).

  88. 88.

    Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, para 273.

  89. 89.

    Chemtura Corporation v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Award, 2 August 2010, para 134.

  90. 90.

    Crystallex International Corporation v. Venezuela, ICSID, Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, 4 April 2016, para 583.

  91. 91.

    Ibid.

  92. 92.

    Windstream Energy LLC v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2013-22, Award, 27 September 2016, para 378.

  93. 93.

    Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. the United States, ICSID, Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award, 25 August 2014, para 9.37.

  94. 94.

    Ibid.

  95. 95.

    Methanex Corporation v. the United States, UNCITRAL, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 3 August 2005, para 101.

  96. 96.

    Ioannis Kardassoupoulos and Ron Fuchs v. Georgia, ICSID, Case Nos. ARB/05/18 and ARB/07/15, Award, 3 March 2010, para 391.

  97. 97.

    Glamis Gold, Ltd v. the United States, UNCITRAL, Award, 8 June 2009, para 779.

  98. 98.

    Glamis, para 779.

  99. 99.

    Ioan Micula et al v. Romania, ICSID, Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 24 September 2008, paras 94–95. The deference here, however, was not shown to respondent, but to Sweden for the purposes of determining whether the foreign investor qualified under the Sweden/Romania BIT.

  100. 100.

    Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. The Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), ICSID, Case No. ARB/08/6, Interim Decision on the Environmental Counterclaim, 11 August 2015, para 35.

  101. 101.

    William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability 17 March 2015, para 437. This paragraph was cited approvingly in Mesa Power Group, LLC v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-17, Award, 24 March 2016, para 505.

  102. 102.

    The literature here is immense, but see generally on these cases e.g. Henckels (2012) with further references.

  103. 103.

    LG&E, para 239; Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 5 September 2008; Total, paras 164–165. See also Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL Award on Damages, 31 May 2002, para 155.

  104. 104.

    Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 5 September 2008, para 181.

  105. 105.

    CMS; Enron; Sempra.

  106. 106.

    Such as Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT.

  107. 107.

    Sempra, para 351; Enron, para 309.

  108. 108.

    Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, 8 December 2016, para 716.

  109. 109.

    Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, 8 December 2016, para 717.

  110. 110.

    Sempra, para 351; Enron, para 309.

  111. 111.

    Teco Guatemala Holdings v. The Guatemala, ICSID, Case No. ARB/10/17, Award, 19 December 2013, para 490; Foresight Luxembourg Solar 1 S. Á.R1., et al. v. Spain, SCC Case No. 2015/150, para 363, citing Philip Morris Brands SÀRL, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A., v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Final Award, 8 July 2016, para 422. See also e.g. ES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, 23 September 2010, para 9.3.73 and Novenergia II - Energy & Environment (SCA) (Grand Duchy of Luxembourg), SICAR, v. Spain, SCC Case No. 2015/063, para 688 and Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v. Sultanate of Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, Award, 3 November 2015, para 389.

  112. 112.

    Glamis, para 804.

  113. 113.

    Philip Morris Brands SÀRL, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A., v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Final Award, 8 July 2016, para 399.

  114. 114.

    Ibid.

  115. 115.

    AES Solar and Others (PV Investors) v Spain, PCA Case No. 2012-14, 28 February 2020, Final Award, para 583; Hydro Energy 1 S.à r.l and Hydroxana Sweden AB v Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/42, Decision on Jurisdiction, Liability and Directions on Quantum, 9 March 2020, para 589. “The expression “margin of appreciation” can be used to convey the point that the State’s right to regulate is subject to a wide latitude, subject to its compliance with its duties under the ECT and customary international law.” See also Cavalum SGPS S.A. v Spain, Decision on Jurisdiction, Liability and Directions on Quantum, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/34 31 August 2020, paras 419 and 432.

  116. 116.

    RREEF v. Spain, Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, 30 November 2018, paras 241–242.

  117. 117.

    Ibid.

  118. 118.

    Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID, Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 24 October 2010, para 283.

  119. 119.

    Rusoro Mining Limited v. Venezuela, ICSID, Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5, Award, 22 August 2016, para 385 and Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italy, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, Final Award 27 December 2016, para 318. See also Reinhard Unglaube v. Costa Rica, ICSID, Case No. ARB/09/20, Award, 16 May 2012, para 246.

  120. 120.

    Frontier Petroleum v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 12 November 2010, para 527.

  121. 121.

    Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003, para 122. Similarly, Electrabel S.A. v Hungary. ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, 30 November 2012, para 8.35.

  122. 122.

    Vestey Group Ltd v. Venezuela, ICSID, Case No. ARB/06/4, Award, 15 April 2016.

  123. 123.

    Ibid, para 294.

  124. 124.

    Ibid.

  125. 125.

    See Leonhardsen (2012).

  126. 126.

    “In the Tribunal’s view, the limits of the State’s power are drawn by the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, which must guide a tribunal’s assessment of the allegedly harmful changes in the legislation.” AES Solar and Others (PV Investors) v Spain, PCA Case No. 2012-14, 28 February 2020, Final Award, para 583.

  127. 127.

    Vanessa Ventures Ltd v. Venezuela, ICSID, Case No. ARB (AF)/04/6, Award, 16 January 2013, para 217.

  128. 128.

    See also e.g. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, 11 September 2007, para 318.

  129. 129.

    Vanessa Ventures Ltd v. Venezuela, para 228.

  130. 130.

    Teco Guatemala Holdings v. Guatemala, ICSID, Case No. ARB/10/17, Award, 19 December 2013, para 483. See also the discussion in paras 511–519.

  131. 131.

    Langborger v. Sweden, Judgment, 22 June 1989, para 32.

  132. 132.

    E.g. Henryk Urban and Ryszard Urban v. Poland, Application No. 23614/08, Judgment, 30 November 2010, para 46.

  133. 133.

    Article 8(1) and 14(1) respectively.

  134. 134.

    Deutsche Bank AG v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/2, Award of 31 October 2012, para 524.

  135. 135.

    The Rompetrol Group NV v. Romania, ICSID, Case No. ARB/06/3, Award, 6 May 2013, para 279.

  136. 136.

    Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, 5 October 2012, para 450.

  137. 137.

    See generally the critique of Philip Morris, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion Co-Arbitrator Gary Born, 8 July 2016, paras 180–196.

  138. 138.

    Quasar de Valores SICAV S.A., Orgor de Valores SICAV S.A., GBI9000 SICAV S.A and Alos 34 S.L. v. The Russian Federation, SCC No. 24/2007, Award, 20 July 2012, para 22.

  139. 139.

    Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, 6 February 2007, para 354.

  140. 140.

    Bernhard von Pezold and others v. Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15, Award, 28 July 2015, para 465.

  141. 141.

    Ibid, para 466.

  142. 142.

    Ibid.

  143. 143.

    Philip Morris, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion Co-Arbitrator Gary Born, 8 July 2016, para 87.

  144. 144.

    Ibid. See also his “Additional Observations” in paras 180–196.

  145. 145.

    Ibid.

  146. 146.

    Ibid, 189.

  147. 147.

    However, if para 176 of the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion is any indication, it would not have helped much: “In these circumstances, and even accepting the Tribunal’s “margin of appreciation” for the sake of argument, I cannot agree that the single presentation requirement satisfied the requirements of rationality and proportionality. Mindful of Uruguay’s extensive legislative authority and broad regulatory discretion, it is still impossible to see how a hastily-adopted measure that is so ill-suited to its articulated purpose, and that treads so far onto protected rights and interests, can satisfy even the Tribunal’s stated standard.”

  148. 148.

    Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, paras 28–31.

  149. 149.

    Case of Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Sahin v. Turkey, Application No. 13279/05, Judgment of 20 October 2011.

  150. 150.

    Ibid, para 94.

  151. 151.

    In his dissenting and concurring opinion, Born effectively distinguished the Sahin case from what took place in the Philip Morris case, noting in particular that in contrast with the Sahin case, in Philip Morris the conflicting issues concerned the same entity and the same facts.

  152. 152.

    Kurşun v. Turkey, application no 22677/10, 30 October 2018, paras 98–99.

  153. 153.

    RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, 30 November 2018, Dissenting Opinion of Volterra.

  154. 154.

    Philip Morris, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion Co-Arbitrator Gary Born, 8 July 2016, para 189.

  155. 155.

    Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID, Case No. ARB/00/9, Award, 16 September 2003, para 20.33.

  156. 156.

    Chemtura, supra note 89, para 123. See however para 134.

  157. 157.

    Ibid.

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  1. EFTA Surveillance Authority, Brussel, Belgium

    Erlend M. Leonhardsen

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  2. Bundeswehr University Munich, Neubiberg, Germany

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  3. Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany

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Leonhardsen, E.M. (2021). Designing Deference: Towards a Thin Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Investment Law?. In: Bäumler, J., et al. European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2021. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/8165_2021_74

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