The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Interdependent Preferences

  • Peter C. Fishburn
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_934

Abstract

Interdependent preferences arise in economic theory in the study of both individual decisions and group decisions. We imagine that a decision is required among alternatives in a set X and that the decision will depend on preferences between the elements in X. If the preferences represent different points of view about the relative desirability of the alternatives, of if they are based on multiple criteria that impinge on the decision, then we encounter the possibility of interdependent preferences.

JEL Classifications

D7 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter C. Fishburn
    • 1
  1. 1.