The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Local Public Finance

  • John M. Quigley
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_737

Abstract

The mobility of consumers and producers in response to fiscal incentives gives the study of local public finance its distinctive character. Households and firms are partitioned into spatial units on the basis of preferences, costs and the incentives provided by local tax and expenditure policies. These fiscal incentives are, in turn, chosen by the members of each of these jurisdictions or clubs. Externalities within and between these localities greatly affect the efficiency of taxation and the provision of public goods and services.

Keywords

Clubs Congestion Efficient allocation Excise taxes Exclusionary zoning Intergovernmental grants Inter-jurisdictional competition Lindahl tax structure Local public finance Local public goods Lump-sum taxes Marginal rate of substitution Marginal rate of transformation Median voter theorem Poll tax Property taxation Public finance Public goods Residential mobility Revenue sharing Stabilization Tax price Technical change Tiebout hypothesis 

JEL Classifications

H7 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • John M. Quigley
    • 1
  1. 1.