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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics pp 362–366Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Anti-trust Policy

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Abstract

Although many countries have adopted antitrust statutes and have an active antitrust enforcement programme, the United States was the first to enact national legislation on monopolies and monopolization. To be sure, English common law dealt with some of these matters long before the Sherman Act was passed in 1890. But the United States was and remains a leader in antitrust legislation, enforcement and research. The discussion herein focuses on the development of antitrust economics and related changes in antitrust enforcement within the United States.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-1-349-95121-5

    Oliver E. Williamson

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  1. Oliver E. Williamson
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© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

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Williamson, O.E. (2018). Anti-trust Policy. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_680

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