The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Anti-trust Policy

  • Oliver E. Williamson
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_680

Abstract

Although many countries have adopted antitrust statutes and have an active antitrust enforcement programme, the United States was the first to enact national legislation on monopolies and monopolization. To be sure, English common law dealt with some of these matters long before the Sherman Act was passed in 1890. But the United States was and remains a leader in antitrust legislation, enforcement and research. The discussion herein focuses on the development of antitrust economics and related changes in antitrust enforcement within the United States.

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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Oliver E. Williamson
    • 1
  1. 1.