Abstract
Bribery is a form of rent-seeking meant to induce officials to serve private interests. Principal–agent relations are at the heart of the economic analysis of the subject. Bribery undermines government functioning by influencing electoral outcomes, lowering the benefits from public contracts, distorting the allocation of public benefits and costs, and introducing delay and red tape. Empirical work documents the negative consequences of corruption, and economic theory helps one understand the underlying incentives for payoffs.
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Rose-Ackerman, S. (2018). Bribery. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_643
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_643
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