The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Cooperative Games

  • Martin Shubik
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_568

Abstract

The title ‘cooperative games’ would be better termed games in coalitional form. The theory of games originally developed different conceptual forms, together with their associated solution concepts, namely, games in extensive form, in strategic form, and in coalitional form (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). The game in strategic form is sometimes referred to as the game in normal form, while that in coalitional form is also referred to as the game in characteristic form.

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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin Shubik
    • 1
  1. 1.