The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Arrow–Debreu Model of General Equilibrium

  • John Geanakoplos
Reference work entry


In the 1950s Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu showed that the market system could be comprehensively analysed in terms of the neoclassical methodological premises of individual rationality, market clearing, and rational expectations, using the two mathematical techniques of convexity and fixed point theory. In so doing they greatly advanced the use of mathematics in economics.


Agent optimization Arrow–Debreu model of general equilibrium Asymmetric information Bankruptcy Bounded rationality Brouwer’s fixed point theorem Coalitions Commodities Comparative statics Competitive equilibrium Consumption loan model Convexity Core Cournot’s duopoly model Differential pay principle Existence of equilibrium Externalities Fixed point theorems General equilibrium Hicks, J. R. Incomplete markets Individualism Insurance markets Interpersonal utility comparisons Kakutani’s fixed point theorem Lindahl equilibrium Local uniqueness Market clearing Mathematical economics Mathematics and economics Microfoundations Minkowski’s theorem Monotonicity Negative prices Neoclassical economics Neoclassical production function Non-satiation hypothesis Ordinal utility Overlapping generations model Pareto optimality Preference Price Rational expectations Rational expectations equilibrium Rationality Risk allocation Samuelson, P. A. Sard’s theorem Separating hyperplane theorem Tâtonnement Transversality theory Uncertainty Utility Walras’s Law Welfare economics Welfare theorems 

JEL Classifications

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© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • John Geanakoplos
    • 1
  1. 1.