Abstract
‘Countervailing power’ is a term coined by J.K. Galbraith (1952) to describe the ability of large buyers in concentrated downstream markets to extract price concessions from suppliers. Galbraith saw countervailing power as an important force offsetting suppliers’ increased market power arising from the general trend of increased concentration in US industries. He provided examples such as a nationwide grocery chain extracting wholesale price discounts from food producers, and large auto manufacturers extracting price discounts from steel producers.
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Snyder, C.M. (2018). Countervailing Power. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_519
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_519
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