Marine fisheries throughout the world continued to be severely overexploited throughout the 20th century and beyond. Even under intensive ‘scientific’ management many important fisheries have collapsed, some never to recover. Vast overcapacity of fishing fleets is also widespread. Both outcomes can be attributed to the common-pool aspect of fishery resources. One method of countering these developments, individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs), is currently in use in several countries. Provided this instrument is combined with resource taxes (royalties), an efficient and equitable management system is feasible. (Owing to lack of jurisdiction, deep-sea fisheries seem destined to continue to suffer from overfishing).
KeywordsBionomic equilibrium Common property resources Extended fisheries jurisdiction (EFJ) zones Fisheries Individual fishing quotas (IFQs) Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) Maximum sustainable yield (MSY) paradigm Precautionary management Resource rents Royalities
- Charles, A. 2001. Sustainable fishery systems. Oxford: Blackwell Science.Google Scholar
- Clark, C. 2006. Worldwide crisis in fisheries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
- Cunningham, S., and T. Bostock, eds. 2005. Successful fisheries management. Delft: Eburon Academic Publishers.Google Scholar