The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities

  • Jagdish N. Bhagwati
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_397

Abstract

Directly unproductive profit-seeking (DUP) activities are defined (Bhagwati 1982a) as ways of making a profit (that is, income) by undertaking activities which are directly (that is, immediately, in their primary impact) unproductive, in the sense that they produce pecuniary returns but do not produce goods or services that enter a conventional utility function or inputs into such goods and services.

Keywords

Chicago School Directly unproductive profit-seeking (DUP) activities Endogeneous tariffs Immiserizing growth Lobbying Optimal tariffs Predation Production subsidies Public choice Regulation Rent seeking Revenue seeking Shadow pricing Smuggling Tariff seeking Tariffs Transfer problem Voluntary export restrictions 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jagdish N. Bhagwati
    • 1
  1. 1.