The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Political Economy of Unearned Foreign Income

An Application for Non-oil Producing Muslim States
  • Faisal Z. Ahmed
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_3059

Abstract

This entry argues that foreign aid and remittances constitute a form of “unearned foreign income” that has affected the public finances and shaped political outcomes in the non-oil producing Muslim countries in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Aid and remittance flows have stabilized authoritarian rule in this “broader” Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region by reducing the likelihood of conflict, fostering corruption, and extending the duration of non-democratic governments.

Keywords

Foreign aid Remittances Unearned income Governance Non-democracy 

JEL

F3 P16 F24 F35 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Princeton UniversityPrinceton NJUSA

Section editors and affiliations

  • Adeel Malik

There are no affiliations available