The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Licensing of Copyright Works

  • Richard Watt
Reference work entry


The article discusses the microeconomic theory behind copyright licensing. It analyses and mentions (at the least) the general economics of copyrights and how the income that is generated along the value chain can be transferred and shared using contracts, issues related to risk and risk bearing in copyright licensing, issues related to market power, issues related to hold-up and essential inputs, and issues related to collective licensing arrangements. The flavour of the article is theoretic, and it is written at a level of upper undergraduate economics courses. It equips the reader with a good knowledge base for understanding the principle issues that are at play as far as copyright licensing is concerned.


Licensing Copyright Economics Efficiency 

JEL Codes

D23 D45 D71 D86 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of CanterburyCanterburyNew Zealand

Section editors and affiliations

  • Robert Picard

There are no affiliations available