The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Central Bank Communication

  • Michael Ehrmann
  • Marcel Fratzscher
Reference work entry


Since the early 1990s, communication has become a primary tool for monetary authorities in managing expectations, both of financial markets and of the wider public, and an important ingredient in making the central bank accountable. The rapidly growing literature on central bank communication clearly confirms the importance of communication in managing expectations, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of monetary policy. Yet there is a large degree of heterogeneity in communication practices across monetary authorities in the world, and there continues to be a lively and controversial debate about what constitutes an optimal communication strategy.


Accountability Central bank Communication Expectations Financial markets Independence Inflation Monetary policy Objectives Policy decisions Predictability Transparency 

JEL Classifications

E52 E58 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Ehrmann
    • 1
  • Marcel Fratzscher
    • 1
  1. 1.