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Economics of Franchises

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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

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Abstract

Franchising, which is common in many advanced economies, is a contractual form of vertical integration. This article examines the economic rationale for choosing franchising over vertical integration. It also examines the influence of the franchisor’s ability to maximize its own profit.

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Bibliography

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    Roger D. Blair & Jessica S. Haynes

Authors
  1. Roger D. Blair
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  2. Jessica S. Haynes
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© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

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Blair, R.D., Haynes, J.S. (2018). Economics of Franchises. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2959

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