International Coordination of Regulation
Reference work entry
First Online:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2955
Abstract
Trade among states with diverse regulatory systems creates the possibility of taking advantage of the cost differentials in production that result. However, it is increasingly clear that what happens in one jurisdiction affects policy in other jurisdictions. It is often argued that this creates a ‘race to the bottom’ effect, where the most lax regulation gains an advantage, but the evidence on this is mixed, at best, and there is a plausible argument too for a ‘race to the top’ effect, where states set high regulatory standards as a barrier to entry.
Keywords
Comparative advantage Delaware effect California effect Policy information interdependence Race to the bottom Race to the top Regulation Regulatory competitionJEL Classifications
K2 K23 L50 L51This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.
Notes
Acknowledgment
Thanks go to Elta Smith, for her research assistance with respect to this paper.
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