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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics pp 2817–2836Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Development Economics

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Abstract

This article surveys the current state of development economics, a subject that studies growth, inequality, poverty and institutions in the developing world. The article is organized around a view that emphasizes the role of history in creating development traps or slow progress. This ‘non-convergence’ viewpoint stands in contrast to a more traditional view, also discussed, based on the notion of economic convergence (across individuals, regions or countries). Some specific research areas in development economics receive closer scrutiny under this overall methodological umbrella, among them political economy, credit markets, legal issues, collective action and conflict.

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  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    Debraj Ray & Clive Bell

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Ray, D., Bell, C. (2018). Development Economics. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_292

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