The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Ostrom, Elinor (1933–2012)

  • Paul Dragos Aligica
  • Peter Boettke
Reference work entry


Elinor Ostrom, a recipient of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009, had a foundational contribution to the Public Choice movement and to the rise of the new institutionalism and has been a key figure in the resurgence of political economy. Her studies of common pool resources, economic governance and institutional diversity are an attempt to transcend the ‘markets vs. states’ dichotomy and are marked by a distinctive approach, relying on multiple methods, interdisciplinary collaborative teamwork and the primacy of empirical observations in field and laboratory settings.


Common pool resources Economic governance Institutionalism Public choice Public economies Political economy 

JEL Classifications

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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul Dragos Aligica
    • 1
  • Peter Boettke
    • 1
  1. 1.