Abstract
In a single-winner voting system, approval voting gives voters the possibility to cast a ballot for (or ‘approve of’) as many candidates as they wish – that is, voters are freed from the constraint of voting for only one candidate. The candidate receiving the greatest total number of votes is declared the winner. Approval voting has several compelling advantages over other voting procedures, and has been used by various governments and organisations around the world.
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Aragones, E., Castanheira, M. (2018). Approval Voting. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2917
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2917
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