The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Shapley, Lloyd S. (Born 1923)

  • Manel Baucells
  • Raul Lejano
  • Cheng-Zhong Qin
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2866

Abstract

Lloyd Shapley is considered one of the pioneers of game theory. His most prominent contributions are the inception and study of value theory and core theory. These two theories are the key to solving problems involving the allocation of goods or payoffs achievable through cooperation. Shapley’s contributions have led to a broad range of important achievements, such as the exploration of stable solutions for matching and exchange, the measurement of power and a deeper understanding of market economies. His contributions to non-cooperative game theory include the introduction of stochastic games, strategic market games and potential games. Shapley shared with Alvin E. Roth the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences.

Keywords

Assignment Bargaining theory Coalitions Cooperative game theory Core Cost allocation Deferred-acceptance algorithm Game theory Incomplete preferences Matching Ordinal solutions Potential games Shapley Shapley value Stochastic games Utility categories 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Manel Baucells
    • 1
  • Raul Lejano
    • 1
  • Cheng-Zhong Qin
    • 1
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