The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Anti-dumping

  • Bruce A. Blonigen
  • Thomas J. Prusa
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2809

Abstract

Antidumping is a legal statute that allows for a remedy to offset the effects of dumped imports. Antidumping has emerged as the preferred method of trade protection, accounting for more disputes than all the other trade statutes combined. The economic rationale for current antidumping statutes is weak and generally inconsistent with competition policies. Empirical evidence suggests that antidumping activity is motivated by the same political economy considerations that lead to other forms of trade protection. The economic impact of antidumping remedies can be significant, often dramatically reducing import flows and imposing welfare costs as great as any current trade distortion.

Keywords

Antidumping Cartels Collusion Competition policy Fair value Predatory pricing Price discrimination Protection Strategic behaviour Trade diversion Voluntary export restraints 

JEL Classifications

F13 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bruce A. Blonigen
    • 1
  • Thomas J. Prusa
    • 1
  1. 1.