This article explores the enforcement of those laws intended to promote competitive markets through the prohibition of certain practices such as price-fixing, welfare-reducing mergers, and monopolization. The discovery and prosecution of violations are examined, including the role of leniency programmes. The determination of penalties is investigated with an assessment of their relationship to optimal penalties. Enforcement policy is found to vary over time and its determinants are reviewed. Finally, the efficacy of enforcement is assessed.
KeywordsAntitrust enforcement Antitrust penalties Cartels Collusion Corporate Leniency Program Price fixing
I appreciate the comments of Vivek Ghosal.
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