Abstract
We call an act altruistic when it is a sacrifice that benefits others. We discuss how experiments have demonstrated that altruistic choices appear to follow the same regularity conditions as those assumed for private goods. In particular they vary rationally in response to changes in prices and circumstances. We show how experiments have distinguished between different economic models of how concern for others enters utility functions, and have explored the implications of those models for charitable giving, labour markets, and trust. We also discuss the experimental evidence for differences in altruism by gender, and work on altruism’s cultural, developmental, and neural foundations.
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Andreoni, J., Harbaugh, W.T., Vesterlund, L. (2018). Altruism in Experiments. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2789
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2789
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