Abstract
The structural analysis of auction data relying on game theoretic models has undergone a tremendous development since the mid-1990s. This article reviews some important contributions for first-price and ascending auctions. It stresses identification of the structure and the development of tractable econometric methods, while addressing bidders’ asymmetry, common value, bidders’ risk aversion, endogenous entry, dynamic and multi-unit auctions as well as the choice of the reserve price and the auction mechanism. Various domains are studied, such as auctions of timber, gas lease, treasury bills, agricultural products, electricity and construction procurements.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsBibliography
Athey, S., and P. Haile. 2002. Identification of standard auction models. Econometrica 70: 2107–2140.
Bajari, P., and A. Hortaçsu. 2003. The winner’s curse, reserve prices and endogenous entry: Empirical insights from eBay auctions. Rand Journal of Economics 34: 329–355.
Campo, S., E. Guerre, I. Perrigne, and Q. Vuong. 2006. Semiparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk averse bidders. Working paper. University Park: Pennsylvania State University.
Guerre, E., I. Perrigne, and Q. Vuong. 2000. Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions. Econometrica 68: 525–574.
Haile, P., and E. Tamer. 2003. Inference with an incomplete model of English auctions. Journal of Political Economy 111: 1–51.
Hong, H., and M. Shum. 2003. Econometric models of asymmetric ascending auctions. Journal of Econometrics 112: 327–358.
Hortaçsu, A. 2002. Mechanism choice and strategic bidding in divisible good auctions: An empirical analysis of the Turkish treasury auction market. Working paper. Chicago: University of Chicago.
Jofre-Bonet, M., and M. Pesendorfer. 2003. Estimation of a dynamic auction game. Econometrica 71: 1443–1489.
Laffont, J.-J., and Q. Vuong. 1996. Structural analysis of auction data. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 86: 414–420.
Laffont, J.-J., H. Ossard, and Q. Vuong. 1995. Econometrics of first-price auctions. Econometrica 63: 953–980.
Li, T., I. Perrigne, and Q. Vuong. 2000. Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions. Journal of Econometrics 98: 129–161.
Paarsch, H. 1992. Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions. Journal of Econometrics 51: 191–215.
Porter, R. 1995. The role of information in US offshore oil and gas lease auctions. Econometrica 63: 1–27.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Copyright information
© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
About this entry
Cite this entry
Perrigne, I., Vuong, Q. (2018). Auctions (Empirics). In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2762
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2762
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-95188-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-95189-5
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences