The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Auctions (Empirics)

  • Isabelle Perrigne
  • Quang Vuong
Reference work entry


The structural analysis of auction data relying on game theoretic models has undergone a tremendous development since the mid-1990s. This article reviews some important contributions for first-price and ascending auctions. It stresses identification of the structure and the development of tractable econometric methods, while addressing bidders’ asymmetry, common value, bidders’ risk aversion, endogenous entry, dynamic and multi-unit auctions as well as the choice of the reserve price and the auction mechanism. Various domains are studied, such as auctions of timber, gas lease, treasury bills, agricultural products, electricity and construction procurements.


Affiliated private value model Asymmetric information Auctions Bayesian Nash equilibrium Bidding Collusion Game theory Log-normal distribution Maximum likelihood Maximum likelihood Nonlinear least squares Nonparametric estimation Nonparametric methods Reserve price Risk aversion 

JEL Classification

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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Isabelle Perrigne
    • 1
  • Quang Vuong
    • 1
  1. 1.