The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Auctions (Theory)

  • Lawrence M. Ausubel
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2746

Abstract

Auction theory has undergone two waves of innovation. The first, which originated with Vickrey (1961) and was completed in the early 1980s, focused on single-item auctions. Results included: guiding principles such as revenue equivalence; the derivation of the optimal auction; and comparisons of first-price, second-price and English auctions. The second, influenced by Treasury and spectrum auctions, emerged in the 1990s and dealt particularly with multi-item auctions. Research has studied: static auctions, including pay-as-bid and uniform-price auctions; dynamic auctions such as simultaneous ascending and clock auctions; combinatorial auctions; and efficient auction design. Much progress has been made, but outstanding problems remain.

Keywords

Auctions Auctions (theory) Bidding Clock auction Coalitional form game Combinatorial auctions Complements Core Demand reduction Dutch auction Efficient auctions English auction Envelope theorem Equilibrium Experimental economics First-price auction Game theory Games of complete information Games of incomplete information Incentive compatibility Linkage principle Optimal auctions Pay-as-bid auction Private information Revenue equivalence theorem Sealed-bid auctions Second-price auction Simultaneous ascending auctions Sincere bidding Spectrum auctions Subgame perfection Substitutes Tâtonnement Treasury auctions Uniform-price auction Vickrey auction Vickrey, W. S. Walrasian auctioneer Winner’s curse 

JEL Classifications

D44 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lawrence M. Ausubel
    • 1
  1. 1.