The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Procurement

  • Yeon-Koo Che
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2716

Abstract

Firms and government agencies rely increasingly on goods and services procured from outside suppliers. How to assure desired quality at a minimal cost in the procurement is often challenging and warrants carefully devised contracting policies. This article reviews several problems arising in procurement and policies designed to remedy them.

Keywords

Adverse selection Auction contests Auctions Collusion Corruption Cost-plus contracts Fixed-price contracts Mechanism design Option contracts Outsourcing Procurement Quality assurance Reputation Risk aversion Risk sharing Scoring auctions Virtual cost 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yeon-Koo Che
    • 1
  1. 1.