The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd


  • Martin W. Cripps
Reference work entry


We explain what reputation effects are, how they arise and the factors that limit or strengthen them.


Collusion Complete information games Conflicting interest games Extensive form games Imperfect monitoring Incomplete information games Industrial organization Jensen’s inequality Markov equilibria Martingales Prisoner’s dilemma Repeated games Reputation Signalling Tit-for-tat Uncertainty 

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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin W. Cripps
    • 1
  1. 1.