Abstract
The basic theory of strategic and extensive games is described. Strategic games, Bayesian games, extensive games with perfect information, and extensive games with imperfect information are defined and explained. Among the solution concepts discussed are Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, subgame perfect equilibrium, and weak sequential equilibrium.
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Acknowledgment
I am grateful to Jean Guillaume Forand for comments and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial support.
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Osborne, M.J. (2018). Strategic and Extensive Form Games. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2694
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2694
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