The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Strategic and Extensive Form Games

  • Martin J. Osborne
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2694

Abstract

The basic theory of strategic and extensive games is described. Strategic games, Bayesian games, extensive games with perfect information, and extensive games with imperfect information are defined and explained. Among the solution concepts discussed are Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, subgame perfect equilibrium, and weak sequential equilibrium.

Keywords

Auctions Bargaining game Bayesian games Behavioural strategy Bertrand oligopoly Correlated equilibrium Cournot oligopoly Cournot, A. Extensive games with imperfect information Extensive games with perfect information Hotelling, H. Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium Nash equilibrium Prisoner’s Dilemma Rationalizability Strategic games Subgame perfect equilibrium 

JEL Classifications

C7 
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Notes

Acknowledgment

I am grateful to Jean Guillaume Forand for comments and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial support.

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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin J. Osborne
    • 1
  1. 1.