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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics pp 2801–2807Cite as

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Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics

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Abstract

We review the literature on deterministic evolutionary dynamics in game theory. We describe the micro-foundations of dynamic evolutionary models and offer some basic examples. We report on stability theory for evolutionary dynamics, and we discuss the senses in which evolutionary dynamics support and fail to support traditional game-theoretic solution concepts.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    William H. Sandholm

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  1. William H. Sandholm
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Sandholm, W.H. (2018). Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2667

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