The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Intrahousehold Welfare

  • Marcel Fafchamps
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2664

Abstract

This article focuses on the allocation of tasks and consumption within the household. We first discuss the role of the household in the production of various self-consumed goods and services. We then turn to the outcome of bargaining between household members, examining the empirical evidence to date. The last section makes the link between intrahousehold welfare and the matching of spouses in the marriage market.

Keywords

Altruism Bargaining Becker, G. Collective versus unitary models of the household Comparative advantage Consumption decisions Distribution of income and wealth Division of labour Economies of size Household production and public goods Human capital Identification Income-pooling test Inequality Inheritance Intrahousehold welfare Marriage and divorce Marriage markets Paternalism Preferences Pre-nuptial agreements Rotten kid theorem Sharing rule Social norms 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marcel Fafchamps
    • 1
  1. 1.