The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Learning and Evolution in Games: Belief Learning

  • John Nachbar
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2645

Abstract

In the context of learning in games, belief learning refers to models in which players are engaged in a dynamic game and each player optimizes with respect to a prediction rule that gives a forecast of next-period opponent behaviour as a function of the current history. This article focuses on the most studied class of dynamic games, namely, two-player discounted repeated games with finite stage game action sets and perfect monitoring.

Keywords

Belief learning Best-response dynamics Convergence Cournot, A. A. Distributional strategies Dynamic games Fictitious play Folk theorem Learnable best-response property Mixed strategy equilibrium Myopia Perfect monitoring Prediction rules Purification Repeated games 

JEL Classifications

C7 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • John Nachbar
    • 1
  1. 1.