The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Corporate Law, Economic Analysis of

  • Robert Daines
  • Michael Klausner
Reference work entry


Economic analysis of corporate law largely focuses on (a) the efficiency of legal rules and the proper role of the law, (b) the ways in which legal rules affect shareholders’ ability to monitor managers, and (c) the effect of limited liability on the relationship between the corporation and third parties. This article reviews the literature in each of these areas.


Agency costs Collective action problem Contractarian conception of the corporation Corporate charters Corporate control Ccorporate governance Corporate law Corporations Federalism Hedge funds Herding Insider trading Law and economics Learning externalities Limited liability Monitoring Network externalities Ownership and control Poison pill Race to the top/bottom Shareholder activism Shareholder suits State competition Takeover defence Takeovers 

JEL Classifications

K22 G34 G38 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert Daines
    • 1
  • Michael Klausner
    • 1
  1. 1.