Abstract
How should a coalition of cooperating players allocate payoffs to its members? This question arises in a broad range of situations and evokes an equally broad range of issues. For example, it raises technical issues in accounting, if the players are divisions of a corporation, but involves issues of social justice when the context is how people behave in society.
Despite the breadth of possible applications, coalitional game theory offers a unified framework and solutions for addressing such qsts. This article presents some of its major models and proposed solutions.
Keywords
- Additive games
- Auction game
- Aumann–Shapley prices
- Axiomatic characterizations
- Balanced games
- Bargaining
- Bargaining sets
- Coalition
- Coalition formation
- Coalitional game
- Coalitional monotonicity
- Communication graph
- Consistency
- Cooperation
- Cooperative game theory
- Core
- Cost allocation
- Dummy player
- Egalitarian solution
- Egalitarian value
- Equivalence th
- Flow game
- Folk th
- Game theory
- Games in coalitional form
- Grand coalition
- Harsanyi value
- Imputation
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives
- Individual monotonicity
- Individual rationality
- Kalai–Smorodinsky solution
- Kernel
- Large market games
- Law of large numbers
- Linear programming game
- Majority game
- Market games
- Maschler–Perles solution
- Matching
- Matching and market design
- Middleman
- Monotonicity
- Nash bargaining games
- Nash solution
- Network games
- No transferable-utility game
- Nucleolus
- Pareto optimality
- Partition games
- Population monotonicity
- Profit sharing
- Raiffa solution
- Shapley value
- Simple games
- Spanning-tree game
- Stable sets
- Strategic game theory
- Supperadditive games
- Transferable-utility game
- Voting games
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Bibliography
The list below includes more than the relatively small number of papers discussed in this article, but due to space limitations many important contributions do not appear here.
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Kalai, E. (2018). Games in Coalitional Form. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2615
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