Economic governance consists of the processes that support economic activity and economic transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and taking collective action to provide appropriate physical and organizational infrastructure. These processes are carried out within institutions, formal and informal. The field of economic governance studies and compares the performance of different institutions under different conditions, the evolution of these institutions, and the transitions from one set of institutions to another.
KeywordsAccountability Arbitration Authoritarianism and economic development Better Business Bureaus (USA) Coase, R. Colonization Commitment Common law vs civil law Common-pool resource management Corporate governance Corruption Corruption control Credit rating agencies Democracy and economic development Democracy: parliamentary vs presidential Discriminating alignment hypothesis Economic governance Electoral rules Ethnic trading networks Evolution of institutions Exploitation Formal vs informal (private) contract enforcement For-profit private institutions Governance Growth and governance Incentive compatibility Inequality Information verifiability Institutions and transition International contracts Mafia Market institutions Monitoring mechanisms Opportunism Political stability Prisoner’s Dilemma Property rights enforcement Regulatory burden Relation-based vs rule-based governance Reputation mechanisms Rule of law Slavery Social networks Social norms Subgame perfection Title registration Transaction cost economics Trust Voice World Bank World Trade Organization Yakuza
I thank Tore Ellingsen, Diego Gambetta, Karla Hoff, Eva Meyersson-Milgrom, Dani Rodrik, Oliver Williamson, and the editors for comments on previous drafts, and the National Science Foundation for research support.
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