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Economic Governance

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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

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Abstract

Economic governance consists of the processes that support economic activity and economic transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and taking collective action to provide appropriate physical and organizational infrastructure. These processes are carried out within institutions, formal and informal. The field of economic governance studies and compares the performance of different institutions under different conditions, the evolution of these institutions, and the transitions from one set of institutions to another.

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Acknowledgments

I thank Tore Ellingsen, Diego Gambetta, Karla Hoff, Eva Meyersson-Milgrom, Dani Rodrik, Oliver Williamson, and the editors for comments on previous drafts, and the National Science Foundation for research support.

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  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    Avinash K. Dixit

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  1. Avinash K. Dixit
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Dixit, A.K. (2018). Economic Governance. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2611

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