The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Interpersonal Utility Comparisons (New Developments)

  • Claude d’Aspremont
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2564

Abstract

Recent developments on interpersonal utility comparisons rely on various interpretations of ‘utility’ indicators and combine in various degrees the ‘subjective’ appreciation of the social states by each individual and their ‘objective’ evaluation by the ethical observer. In a formal welfarist approach, interpersonal comparisons are specified by invariance conditions on social welfare functionals or on social welfare orderings. Interpersonal comparisons have also been introduced through scoring methods.

Keywords

Bargaining solution (Nash) Bentham, J. Capabilities Cardinal utility Collective preference Difference principle (J. Rawls) Egalitarian-equivalent allocation Fair allocation Happiness Harsanyi, J. C. Impossibility theorem Independence of irrelevant alternatives Interpersonal utility comparisons Justice Leximin Mill, J. S. New welfare economics Ophélimité Ordinal utility Pareto, V. Preferences Primary goods Rawls, J. Revealed preference theory Risk aversion Sen, A. Social choice Social welfare function Social welfare ordering Utilitarianism Utility Veil of ignorance Von Neumann and Morgenstern Welfarism 

JEL Classifications

D1 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Claude d’Aspremont
    • 1
  1. 1.